Making Moderates hate Extremists more than they dislike us: Lesson to Sri Lanka

Making moderates hate extremists more than they dislike us or the basic need to undermine the message of extremists sound like good policy options the South Asian nation Sri Lanka should adopt when it is on the verge of thinking how to combat the probable rise of a global power center advocated by the pro-Tamil Tiger operatives in Western nations especially in the U.S. spearheaded by now emerged global Tiger leader Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran and his lieutenant Dr. Elias Jeyarajah.

The creation of a global power center vouched by Rudrakumaran-Jeyerajah duo will operate parallel to the administration in Sri Lanka to undermine the latter’s effort of nation building by creating diplomatic-political-economic embargoes using the duo’s increased clout with U.S. power centers.

Former Bush administration public diplomacy man in the State Department James Glassman’s remarks in the Foreign Policy magazine is worth paying some attention.

Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy James K. Glassman has reiterated his view that public diplomacy “is not about us, and in order to win the war of ideas the US just needs to undermine the message of extremists” in an article for Foreign Policy.

Referring to the conversation between the current Under Secretary of State Judith McHale and Pakistani journalist Ansar Abbasi, which Asian Tribune previously carried, Glassman points out that the latter is known for “his xenophobia, his support for conspiracy theories, and his knee-jerk anti-Americanism.”

In an interview during McHale’s recent trip to Pakistan, Abbasi scolded her "polite presentation about building bridges between America and the Muslim world." Glassman argues that reasoning with people like Abbasi is futile and any attempt at reconciliation is bound to be fruitless.

And similarly any attempt to reason with people like Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran or Elias Jeyarajah is futile and any attempt at reconciliation is bound to be fruitless.

“Making people like us better is a perfectly decent US goal, but is an image-building strategy the most effective use of public diplomacy's tools in such a crucial relationship? And should the US public image even be such a priority in the first place?” he asks.
A point to ponder by Sri Lankan authorities.

However, Glassman also remarks that US public diplomacy should not focus on getting people to like the US, and instead should thrive to undercut violent extremists by helping Pakistanis in their own government and civil society engage their fellow citizens with a more powerful narrative. “The United States need not be Miss Congeniality to win the war of ideas. We just need to make moderates hate extremists more than they dislike us.”

Is there a way the professional public diplomacy and strategic communication experts in the United States Department of State help Sri Lanka at this stage how to identify strategies to get the moderate Tamils living in Sri Lanka and vast number of moderates in the Tamil Diaspora to hate extremists who are hell bent on destroying Sri Lanka including the 12% Tamils instead of establishing dialogues with pro-LTTE extremists to find out how to twist the arm of Rajapaksa regime?

Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are increasingly viewed unfavorably in Pakistan, and although some US measures have contributed to this trend, it is mainly the ruthlessness of extremist acts that shifted public opinion. Glassman nonetheless claims that the US should attempt to improve its image with Pakistanis, although this requires a more realistic approach.

He further comments that while $600 million of the budget for public diplomacy is currently spent on educational and exchange programs, “public diplomacy, as conducted during the Cold War, must be more immediate, countering pernicious ideologies and helping divert young people from following a path that leads to terrorism.”

A message Sri Lanka needs to give serious thought.

The best way to achieve results is by supporting people who share US interests and by providing them with the means to accomplish their goals, Glassman says. He indicates that mutual interests can be achieved, defeating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, without America being more popular than it already is.

Glassman gives some food for thought to a South Asian nation that defeated a ruthless terrorist movement once thought by the West and wide number of professionals as indispensable the importance of working with the Tamil population in the North and East of Sri Lanka who has not particular love for the Tamil Tigers and equally skeptical of Sri Lanka government moves and endeavors to appease them.

The “accurate” narrative, which strategic communications should promote, is that Muslim societies are currently in the midst of profound change and upheaval. “In general, they are coping with the upheaval well and in the end they will succeed, but the struggle is extremely difficult,” Glassman concludes.

So is the struggle of the Tamil people to emerge from the LTTE terror they were once accustomed to.

- Asian Tribune -