State Department Judgments Based on Ambiguous Diplomatic Reports from its Overseas Posts – Official Probes Reveal

The U.S. State Department significantly lacks expertise, diplomatic and intelligence tools. Inadequate developed techniques to propel its overseas diplomatic missions for wider reach to engage with diverse community leaders and communities in the periphery.

Insufficient language skills to make its Foreign Service Officers (FSO) to interact with host country indigenous population. The Department is filling inexperienced junior officers in senior public diplomacy positions who lack requisite experience and expertise to perform effectively.

Having assessed the above scenario, a major investigative report – Genocide Prevention Task Force - co-authored by much respected former secretary of state Madeline Albright and former secretary of defense William Cohen released in December 2008 and now with the Obama administration for study noted: “When our diplomatic and intelligence reporting from the post is inadequate, analysts in Washington are left to make judgments from ambiguous and frequently conflicting information and assessments.”

The seriousness of the inadequacy of reporting and the political reports based on conflicting information and assessments from U.S. overseas diplomatic missions was candidly summarized by Hillary Clinton’s deputy in the state department Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale in a keynote address inaugurating Harvard Public Diplomacy Collaborative in September 2009 in the following manner:

“We cannot sit behind embassy walls and speak only to the people who agree with us. We have to engage, even when we disagree with others. We have to communicate-two-way communication, not one-way messaging-through both government-to-people dialogue and people-to-people dialogue.”

And, does the following statement made by Clinton herself in an interview in Moscow on 12 October (2009) fits for those in the State Department in Washington who sits on judgments and have the tendency all the time to lecture to Third World nations and their leaders what best for their countries with attractive assurances?

Secretary Clinton said in Moscow: “One of the greatest threats we face is from people who believe they are absolutely, certainly right about everything.”

In this media interview she was asked to name the book that had made the biggest impact on her, she singled out “The Brothers Karamazov.” The parable of the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoyevsky’s novel, she said, speaks to the dangers of certitude.

Apart from the Albright-Cohen Genocide Prevention Task Force Report of December 2008 the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of the U.S. Congress in a September 2009-report to the Congress was critical of the operational style of the U.S. State Department. In one observation the report said:

(Begin Quote) As of October 31, 2008, 31 percent of Foreign Service officers in overseas language-designated positions (LDP) did not meet both the foreign languages speaking and reading proficiency requirements for their positions. State continues to face foreign language shortfalls in regions of strategic interest—such as the Near East and South and Central Asia, where about 40 percent of officers in LDPs did not meet requirements. Past reports by GAO, State’s Office of the Inspector General, and others have concluded that foreign language shortfalls could be negatively affecting U.S. activities overseas. Overseas fieldwork for this report reaffirmed this conclusion. (End Quote)

Further, another GAO report on State Department’s Public Diplomacy Workforce presented to the Congress in May 2009 stated:

(Begin Quote) In August 2006, we reported that State's consular and public diplomacy positions were the hardest to fill, with 91 percent of the vacancies in these two tracks at the mid-level. We noted this staffing gap placed pressure on State to appoint junior officers to so-called "stretch positions"--whereby they serve in a position above their pay grade--to fill as many of these vacancies as possible..... Junior officers lack sufficient training to handle some of the high-stress situations they encounter and therefore often end up making mistakes..... Some public diplomacy officers may not have the requisite experience and expertise to perform effectively at their current levels. (End Quote)

If one summarizes these three reports, and what under secretary of state for public diplomacy Judith McHale observed it is not very difficult to arrive at the conclusion that most of the political reports produced by the State Department in Washington are ambiguous and frequently conflicting information based on the reports it gets from overseas diplomatic posts which lack the expertise, diplomatic and intelligence tools and a significant shortfall of credible information of men and matters. The assessments, judgments and recommendations these State Department reports pass on to the U.S. Congress and officials in the White House can mislead policymakers to arrive at seriously flawed decisions that can greatly harm many Third World developing nations – mostly the nations who are not strategically important to the United States.

Ms. McHale sounded an alarm: “We cannot sit behind embassy walls and speak only to the people who agree with us. We have to engage, even when we disagree with others. We have to communicate-two-way communication, not one-way messaging-through both government-to-people dialogue and people-to-people dialogue.”

To fill the gaps what State Department officials in Washington do is to consult with a handful of expatriates living in the U.S. who fit into the mind-set of these officials and officials of human rights organizations who themselves provide ambiguous information. The end result - the Congress and officials in the White House receive narrower interpretation and ambiguous assessment of the issue in hand.

The Genocide Prevention Task Force Report

This Task Force report was authored by former secretaries of state and defense Albright and Cohen, and it was an independent effort to advise the Congress and the State Department how to improve the latter’s reporting requirements of effective early warning of mass atrocities, in what manner the Department lacks in expertise and adequate diplomatic and intelligence tools, and what steps should be taken to improve its credibility in regard to reporting and assessments.

The report was released in December 2008 for the scrutiny of the Congress and the new incoming Obama administration.

Asian Tribune presents here significant observations the Task Force made to inform the reader how ill-equipped the State Department’s current structure is to produce credible reports with cogent assessments, observations and recommendations. In one observation the Task Force Report says:

(Begin Quote) While it is the responsibility of U.S. embassies and missions to know what is happening in their host country, the tendency has been to report on developments in the capital rather than more remote rural areas, if only because of resource constraints.

The availability of news reporting on even remote parts of the world has tempered the information problem significantly. Counterintuitively, how ever, the bounty of information-which can only be expected to grow in the future-does not necessarily ease the analytic challenge. First, the amount of material can be overwhelming, and second, it is hard to judge the accuracy of the reporting. For example, a crucial and difficult task for analysts is to distinguish systematic killing of civilians from more generalized background violence, as most if not all mass atrocities occur in the context of a larger conflict or a campaign of state repression. When our diplomatic and intelligence reporting from the post is inadequate, analysts in Washington are left to make judgments from ambiguous and frequently conflicting information and assessments. (End Quote)

Read the last three lines: “When our diplomatic and intelligence reporting from the (overseas) post is inadequate, analysts in Washington are left to make judgments from ambiguous and frequently conflicting information and assessments.”

When the reports of serious nature such as mass atrocities, war crimes and genocide are prepared, what the Task Force infers is that the reports obtained from overseas diplomatic posts need to be unambiguous for Washington to arrive at sound judgments.

US Agencies involved in Monitoring

U.S. embassies, USAID missions, and U.S. armed forces deployed around the globe represent the front lines of U.S. foreign policy, generating large amounts of information that could be relevant to preventing genocide and mass atrocities. The State Department and USAID employ roughly 6,600 and 1,000 Foreign Service officers (FSOs), respectively, and the U.S. military has about 500,000 troops forward-deployed worldwide. Although early warning of genocide and mass atrocities is mainly the province of the intelligence community and diplomats, all of these U.S. personnel can be valuable sources of information.

Task Force consultations indicate that the intelligence community currently dedicates several to genocide, war crimes, and related issues. This includes a very small War Crimes and Atrocities Analysis Division within the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). At the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the national intelligence officer for warning leads a team of analysts to oversee and coordinate all strategic warning, including that related to genocide and mass atrocities. In addition, the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has a monitoring function, though it remains underdeveloped and its ambit does not explicitly include genocide and mass atrocities. USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) provides analytical and operational tools related to conflict and development, including some assessment activities. There may also be other isolated efforts within the U.S. government related to early warning of genocide and mass atrocities or associated events. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency sponsors a project to develop an integrated crisis early warning system for forecasting and decision support vis-à-vis a wide array of crises, including genocide and mass atrocities.

With all the above USG agencies in place the Albright-Cohen Task Force report observes: (Begin Quote) Lacking high-level focus or an effective coordination hub, however, the dispersed nature of these various efforts has limited their overall impact.

We note also that the State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) prepares annual reports on human rights in nearly every country in the world. The reports are required by statute to include, "wherever applicable, consolidated information regarding the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and evidence of acts that may constitute genocide." But unlike other subjects that are mandated to be discussed (for example, religious freedom), genocide and mass atrocities do not receive mention in every report, even if only to note that there is no evidence of problems. (End Quote)

The following discovery of the Task Force is a clear interpretation of how the U.S. State Department Washington-written reports for the use of the Congress can be ambiguous and possibly include conflicting data and assessments.

(Begin Quote) While U.S. officials increasingly recognize the potential value in cooperating with NGOs for early warning of genocide and mass atrocities, institutional culture, lack of established mechanisms for collaboration, and even legal restrictions on sharing information (for example, high-resolution satellite imagery that can indicate destroyed villages) all limit the current extent of cooperation. Most cooperation with partners in this domain appears to be ad hoc and driven by individuals rather than systems. For example, the ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues convenes monthly meetings in Washington with human rights NGOs, and at least some ambassadors at post convene similar meetings with civil society groups. These appear to be undertaken entirely on the initiative of individual officials, however. (End Quote)

Haphazard Monitoring & Underdeveloped Skills

Under Secretary Judith McHale’s observation “We cannot sit behind embassy walls and speak only to the people who agree with us. We have to engage, even when we disagree with others. We have to communicate-two-way communication, not one-way messaging-through both government-to-people dialogue and people-to-people dialogue,” is a serious warning that connects to the Genocide Prevention Task Force observations about skills to get reports from areas at issue. The warning by Ms. McHale is that the Foreign Service Officers (FSO) in overseas diplomatic posts sit in their offices, meet like-minded host country personnel, send politically explosive cables to Washington, as the Task Force puts it: “When our diplomatic and intelligence reporting from the (overseas) post is inadequate, analysts in Washington are left to make judgments from ambiguous and frequently conflicting information and assessments.”

Then the Task Force observes: “Most cooperation with partners in this domain appears to be ad hoc and driven by individuals rather than systems. For example, the ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues convenes monthly meetings in Washington with human rights NGOs, and at least some ambassadors at post convene similar meetings with civil society groups. These appear to be undertaken entirely on the initiative of individual officials, however.”

Officials in many bureaus in the State Department including the Office of War Crimes Issues often meet like-minded personnel in their Washington offices to justify the ambiguous political cables sent by their overseas posts to give final touches to the reports mandated by the Congress.

When the FSOs lack the understanding and fail to get credible reports from the field about atrocities and genocidal situations the final political cable written at the overseas diplomatic post are liable to make serious misjudgments. The Albright-Cohen report thus states: “Structural risk assessments provide a context for interpreting ambiguous information; for example, when there are significant uncertainties about events developing in a state that exhibits many long-term risk factors, an analyst should be more concerned, whereas the same pattern of events in a place with few or no known structural risk factors should raise less concern.”

Then the Task Force says:

(Begin Quote) No matter what policies, systems, and structures are adopted, effective warning depends on the knowledge and skills of individuals. Therefore, it is imperative that the front lines of America's foreign policy apparatus be equipped to understand genocide and mass atrocities, to recognize conditions that might lead to these crimes, and to employ analytic techniques specially suited to warning (for example, scenario gaming). A training initiative would help analysts distinguish critical warning signs from background noise. It would also promote a shift in the culture of FSOs and analysts writ large, to "get early warning and prevention of genocide into the DNA of regular analysts," in the words of one former official. (End Quote)

In the absence of credible reports and the availability of ambiguous information ‘background noise’ can be interpreted as ‘critical signs’. And these less significant ‘background noise’ coupled with ambiguous information from limited sources can produce bloated reports in U.S. overseas diplomatic missions for the consumption of Washington which can be unreasonably detrimental to the country in question.

Now the Task Force observes about the capacity the State Department’s Office of War Crimes Issues possesses to do war crimes/atrocity/genocide report saying: “The ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues has engaged in some training activities, but these do not appear to be standard.

“Analyst training for early warning of genocide and mass atrocities could be a joint initiative of the national intelligence officer for warning, given his explicit mandate to promote analyst training in techniques that might contribute to improved warning, and the State Department's Office of War Crimes Issues or DRL, given their substantive expertise and reach to FSOs. Both the FSI and the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis would be important partners for a new training initiative.”

The Task Force findings of limited access to host country peripheral districts to arrive at credible assessments say “NGOs and civil society, broadly defined, are critical partners for information collection and analysis. The long-term, ongoing engagement exemplified by regular meetings between American diplomats and NGOs, in the field and in Washington, produces tangible rewards. It should not be left entirely to the discretion of individual officials, but should become standard practice. Local religious leaders in particular are often cognizant of social, political, and economic dynamics in rural areas that U.S. diplomatic missions cannot easily access or monitor. Given this reality, U.S. embassies should explore means by which to engage religious leaders and institutions in early warning efforts.”

Besides early warning, U.S. overseas diplomatic missions have limited or no access to the larger indigenous community and its leaders. The result is what Ms. McHale observed. And, political, economic and military reports written in these overseas posts contain conflicting information and assessments and Washington has no alternative but to depend on them for policy decisions.

Congress report on persistent foreign language shortfalls

The September 2009 report Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls prepared by the (US) Government Accountability Office declared “As of October 31, 2008, 31 percent of Foreign Service officers in overseas language-designated positions (LDP) did not meet both the foreign languages speaking and reading proficiency requirements for their positions. State continues to face foreign language shortfalls in regions of strategic interest—such as the Near East and South and Central Asia, where about 40 percent of officers in LDPs did not meet requirements.”

Due to this shortfall the GAO says “it could hinder U.S. overseas operations.”

All the countries in the South and Central Asian Bureau of the State Department are LDPs.

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The September 2009 GAO investigative report further states:

(Begin Quote) In particular, State continues to face foreign language shortfalls in areas of strategic interest—such as the Near East and South and Central Asia, where about 40 percent of officers in language-designated positions did not meet requirements.

These shortfalls may have adverse impacts on security, public diplomacy, consular operations, economic and political affairs, and other aspects of U.S. diplomacy. (End Quote)

The observation under secretary of state Judith McHale made in September 2009 after reading all these reports that “We cannot sit behind embassy walls and speak only to the people who agree with us. We have to engage, even when we disagree with others. We have to communicate-two-way communication, not one-way messaging-through both government-to-people dialogue and people-to-people dialogue,” can be seen how significant when Washington State Department officials arrive at judgments on existing issues in countries the U.S. represents based on ambiguous and frequently conflicting information and assessments they receive from overseas diplomatic missions.

Some of the reports State Department Washington officials do are mandated by the Congress, and these reports are likely to give distorted picture of the actual ground situation prevalent in those countries at issue.

The limited or the absence of reach by U.S. diplomats in host countries to the peripheral districts and the indigenous civic leaders because of this language shortfall will undoubtedly give a distorted assessment to the Congress that has the authority on foreign economic assistance, military sales and foreign operations such as humanitarian aid.

Unskilled Public Diplomacy Workforce in Overseas Posts

In another Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigative report submitted to the U.S. Congress in May 2009 highlighted that “some public diplomacy officers (posted to overseas U.S. Missions) may not have the requisite experience and expertise to perform effectively at their current levels.”

The GAO report stated: “In August 2006, we reported that State's consular and public diplomacy positions were the hardest to fill, with 91 percent of the vacancies in these two tracks at the mid-level. We noted this staffing gap placed pressure on State to appoint junior officers to so-called "stretch positions"--whereby they serve in a position above their pay grade--to fill as many of these vacancies as possible.”

The report mentioned that the Foreign Service Officers in overseas posts had no sufficient time to travel outside the capital city to reach out to civic groups.

It noted:

(Begin Quote) In 2003, we reported public diplomacy officers at posts were burdened with administrative tasks, and thus had less time to conduct public diplomacy outreach activities than they did when the United States Information Agency was responsible for U.S. public diplomacy efforts. More than 40 percent of the 118 public affairs officers responding to our survey reported the amount of time they had to devote exclusively to executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas fieldwork, officers told us that, while they managed to attend U.S. and other foreign embassy receptions and functions within their host country capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time or staff resources to travel outside the capitals to interact with ordinary citizens. (End Quote)

It further noted, “junior officers lack sufficient training to handle some of the high-stress situations they encounter and therefore often end up making mistakes..... Some public diplomacy officers may not have the requisite experience and expertise to perform effectively at their current levels.”

The GAO report of May 2009 summarizes the ineffectiveness of State Department’s outreach to the periphery of the country in this manner:

(Begin Quote) Having the right people, with the right skills, in the right place is essential to the effective management of any government program. Beginning in 2003, GAO has reported that State's public diplomacy operations have been hampered by insufficient numbers and types of staff, administrative burdens and time constraints, and language proficiency shortfalls. These problems have compromised State's ability to fully execute its public diplomacy mission, led to minimal coverage at certain posts, placed a strain on more-junior staff filling positions above their pay grade, and diminished effectiveness where target language proficiency levels have not been met. (End Quote)

Summary Conclusion

The three official investigative documents revealed the serious shortfall of policy decisions taken at the highest level in the State Department in Washington based on
ambiguous and frequently conflicting information and assessments provided by its overseas diplomatic missions who are ill-equipped in many areas; inadequate language proficiency, limited or no reach to peripheral districts to engage with civic leaders who are much knowledgeable of the ground situation than those who are based in the capital city, heavily depending on officials who have little or no knowledge of the mood of the population outside main cities especially in rural areas, untested junior FSOs holding critically important senior positions who make misjudgments on critical issues etc.

Judgments and recommendations at the State Department Washington level are heavily influenced by the report is gets from the overseas diplomatic posts. The final reports are shaped with the assistance of Washington-based officials of international NGOs, professionals and expatriate Diaspora who are most of the time equally ignorant of the ground situation in the country at issue or the issues surrounding the country.

It is with this clear understanding that the Albright-Cohen Task Force report highlighted: “When our diplomatic and intelligence reporting from the post is inadequate, analysts in Washington are left to make judgments from ambiguous and frequently conflicting information and assessments.”

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale was equally knowledgeable of how U.S. overseas posts function when she declared “We cannot sit behind embassy walls and speak only to the people who agree with us. We have to engage, even when we disagree with others. We have to communicate-two-way communication, not one-way messaging-through both government-to-people dialogue and people-to-people dialogue.”

The Task Force quite rightly said “The availability of news reporting on even remote parts of the world has tempered the information problem significantly. Counterintuitively, how ever, the bounty of information-which can only be expected to grow in the future-does not necessarily ease the analytic challenge. First, the amount of material can be overwhelming, and second, it is hard to judge the accuracy of the reporting.”

Accuracy of the reporting can only be obtained with the wider reach to peripheral districts of countries the U.S. maintain diplomatic missions. The great danger is that Washington heavily depends on inadequate and ambiguous reporting from its overseas diplomatic posts that have little, less or no expertise and skills the three official documents elaborate. As a result, the reports warn, Washington arrives at wrong assessments, judgments and conclusions. U.S. Congress accepts these observations and judgments of the State Department.

The three official investigations were undertaken to adequately warn the Congress which depends heavily on the State Department wisdom, and to recommend what action and necessary adjustments should be made to make the United States overseas operation more effective.

- Asian Tribune -