Sarath Fonseka – TNA agreement: A political solution becomes even more distant now

During the press conference held on the 6th January, Mr Sampanthan very clearly stated that the 13th Amendment, an agreement brokered by India, cannot be repealed unilaterally by one party to the agreement.

Mr Sampanthan is saying here that the other party to the agreement was India, as only it could have been the second party as no other sovereign entity besides Sri Lanka existed to have signed this document if indeed a second party did sign it then. The implication of Mr Sampanthan’s statement is that Sri Lanka had ceded its sovereignty to India in co signing an agreement that was entirely an internal matter for Sri Lanka.

TNA parliamentary group leader R. Sampanthan has told reporters that the opposition candidate General Sarath Fonseka agreed to implement the TNA’s proposal when he is elected to the post of President in Sri Lanka. The TNA Leader however has refused to give details of the confidential agreement they have worked out with General Fonseka.

Mr Sampanthan has said that Mr Fonseka had primarily agreed to withdraw the High Security Zones in North and East and he also agreed to merge the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and also grant a common amnesty for LTTE suspects who are in government custody. – (source Ada Derana 7th January2010)

Mr Sampanthan’s view is that the North East merger was an integral part of the 13th Amendment, and therefore the demerger that was ordered by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka on a petition lodged by none other than the JVP which is now supporting the re merger, should be that rescinded. Former Chief Justice, Mr Sarath Silva, the chief architect of the then Supreme Court decision, has now said the two provinces could be re merged.

These diametrically opposite positions of the JVP and the former Chief Justice are somewhat perplexing to say the least.

Going on the statement made by Mr Sampanthan, the re merger had been agreed with General Fonseka, and unless and until he denies this publicly, the voters of Sri Lanka will have to take it that this is the case. The person who led the Army to defeat the LTTE which was basically asking for a combined North East province with near total devolved powers, has now done an about turn and agreed to the very re merger he would not have countenanced as the Commander of the Army.

It is interesting to note the view of one of the TNA members Mr K. Thurairetnasingam, who appears to hold a more extreme view on a solution to the conflict. In an interview with Vasanthan TV as reported in the Daily News on the 8th of January 2010, Mr Thurairetnasingam had stated that Mr Sarath Fonseka had agreed to comply with all their conditions and the party signed an agreement with him covering these issues.

Mr Thurairetnasingam has reiterated that Fonseka and Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe signed this agreement and the copies of this agreement were sent to the foreign representatives too. “We have already informed about this agreement to diplomats and the foreign Governments,” he said.

He said the TNA will never deviate from its policy of establishing an autonomous regime for the Tamil speaking people. “We do not want the 13th Amendment. We have no confidence in the 13th Amendment.”

He stressed that they want an autonomous regime with all powers.

Mr Thurairetnasingam reportedly stated “The President did not comply with our conditions and therefore this Government should be overthrown. The party requested the President to stop the war on terrorism, but he refused to do so”.

It appears from these divergent views within the TNA that Mr Sampanthan is representing a more moderate view on the re merger while Mr Thurairetnasingam is representing a harder line view on it.

What the voters in Sri Lanka do not know and will not know is how strong or weak each of these views are within the TNA, and which view represents the more long term objective of the TNA and the Tamils they represent.

Besides any emotive reaction to this agreement (written or verbal) between Mr Fonseka and the TNA, moderate Sinhala people will also object to a re merger as they do not know the real intentions of the TNA considering its divergent views on this issue. They would rather not risk paving the way for the extremist view to prevail over time. The extremist view indeed was the view and objective of the LTTE, consequently, one would not be sounding paranoid in arguing that agreeing to a re merger of the North and the East is akin to accepting the cause of the LTTE, if not their methods, if the merger is only the first step towards a Federal State or a separate State. This argument could therefore be extended to state that agreeing to a re merger is a virtual acceptance of the LTTE, and therefore Mr Fonseka, in accepting the demand for a re merger, has now accepted the LTTE which he defeated in battle.

Independent minded observers could rightly ask why so many Sri Lankans paid with their lives and why General Fonseka himself nearly sacrificed himself and why he allowed so many of his Forces to be sacrificed if he is now agreeable to grant, perhaps over time, what the LTTE was fighting for so many years.

It also begs the question why he continued as the Army commander if he thought the LTTE cause, if not their methods were justifiable and acceptable to him. Surely, changing one’s clothes should not have changed one’s view on such an important philosophical issue in such a short space of time?

If he is claiming all credit for defeating the LTTE, then he must also take the responsibility for the deaths of so many LTTE cadres, forces personnel, as well as thousands of innocent civilians. Why did he do that if in his heart of hearts, he had sympathy for the LTTE cause?

If one were to interpret an election platform statement made by the General Secretary of the JVP, they seem to be saying that Mr Fonseka is now a civilian and what he did and said wearing a uniform and in service as the Army Commander, is different to what he says and will do as a civilian. This logic is mind boggles if it applies to the question of the re merger and its linkage to the cause for which the LTTE fought a long battle with the Sri Lankan Army that General Fonseka commanded.

Finally however, we now have a very specific and very significant issue on which the two main Presidential candidates differ, and the voters will be able to make a careful choice as to who they would like as their President for the next six years on the 26th of January 2010. Their decision will reflect the direction that they wish the country to take, and whether they wish an eventual Tamil homeland in the North and East, with powers bordering on what a separate State or Federal State (as a minimum) would have, or whether they wish to have a Sri Lanka that is a unitary State with Tamils enjoying equal rights with all communities anywhere in the country and constitutionally guaranteed power sharing arrangements.

Neither of these views may represent the ideal solution to this conflict and a simple majority vote either way should not be considered the best way of addressing the conflict and finding a solution to end it. What may need to be done eventually is to find a solution that is somewhere in between the two options supported by the two main candidates. However, one needs to consider the starting points of each approach to addressing the conflict before discussing an option that might be ideal but not practical.

From a Tamil point of view, President Rajapaksa’s option of a unitary State with power sharing with all communities may sound like an option even below a minimalist position for them, while General Fonseka’s option of a re merged North East province may sound more like an acceptable minimalist position. However, as far as the Sinhala people are concerned, President Rajapaksa’s option would be the maximalist position that they may wish to entertain as it would not lead to the creation of a Tamil homeland, and possibly a Federal or separate State in the North and East at a later date.

Tamils do need to take into account the simple fact that no solution or peace will be possible without the support of the Sinhala people simply on account of their numerical majority in the country. If the maximalist position of the Sinhala community is a unitary State, with constitutionally guaranteed power sharing arrangements, at central and provincial level, and if they oppose the re merger as it is their belief that it would lead to a Federal or separate State, General Fonseka’s option will not be acceptable to the Sinhala community.

Any election could be very emotive. A Presidential election will be more emotive. This particular Presidential election has become even more emotive and to make matters worse, General Fonseka has thrown a grenade to make it an explosive election.

Unfortunately his option will raise the emotions of the Sinhala community, in many cases, justifiably so, due to the divergent views within the TNA and the secrecy surrounding the agreement between Mr Fonseka and the TNA. This is a great pity as the Sinhala and Tamil communities living in Sri Lanka were slowly but surely trying to forge a new relationship of accommodation and integration. The TNA and Mr Sarath Fonseka have managed to take the country back many years with one handshake and possibly two signatures on a piece of paper.

At best Mr Fonseka’s decision to agree to the TNA demands seems irrational considering the number of Sinhala votes he will lose as a result of his decision, and the greater possibility he will lose the election as a result. At worst, it appears he has been ill advised and misguided, and possibly even influenced by external forces to create fissures between the two major communities in the country, in turn to create disunity in the face of the carefully constructed approach that President Rajapaksa has been taking to bring the Tamil community to the main stream and engage them in national politics and power sharing arrangements.

Voters will have a very serious decision to take on the 26th, as their decision will determine the future of Sri Lanka, whether we will have unity and peace, or disharmony, division and discord. The re merger of the North and East and what it entails in the longer term has now become the single biggest issue during this election, and Mr Sarath Fonseka has introduced this factor to the election. He will probably regret his decision.

Voters will have to decide whether Mr Fonseka has shown good judgment and demonstrated a forward looking vision for Sri Lanka or whether he has acted irresponsibly as a catalyst for discord and disharmony.

- Asian Tribune -