Mac Arthur and Fonseka: A glimpse of history

General Sarath Fonseka case is virtual a repetition of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur’s role during the Korean War of 1950-1953 – although issues are different. The reactions in both cases are remarkably similar. In fact the U.S. Republican Party’s role at the time mirrors that of the Opposition in Sri Lanka today.

“You are not to decide, discuss or confer with anyone or ask political questions; such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions.” - President Abraham Lincoln’s stern instructions to General Ulysses S. Grant

Both Mac Arthur and Fonseka were brilliant military strategists. Both held the highest ranks in the military establishments of their respective countries. But both had massive egos that cared little for civilian authority in a democratic society. MacArthur fought in three major wars – World War I, World War II and the Korean War – and was one of the only five American military officers ever to become five-star Generals while in service. The other were George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Henry H. Arnold and Omar Bradley.

MacArthur was also a Field marshal of the Philippines – a rank (although not in the U.S. Army) created in 1937 to be held by him when he was appointed military advisor to the Philippine Government, which retained his services to form an Army in response to the growing danger from Japan and the rising chance of war in the Pacific.

MacArthur played a leading role in the Pacific Theater of operations in World War II. When Japanese forces defeated U.S. and Filipino troops under MacArthur’s command in March 1942, he vowed to return, defeating the enemy. The General did return victoriously to the Philippines in October 1944 and a year later when Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies in august 1945 MacArthur was appointed Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan having accepted the Tokyo’s surrender.

When the Korean War broke out in 1950 he led the United Nations Forces to defend South Korea against the North Korean invaders. However in April 1951, MacArthur's habitual disregard of his civilian superiors led to a crisis. Like Fonseka before retirement contacting the Opposition to discuss politics, MacArthur sent a letter to Representative Joe Martin (Massachusetts), the House Minority Leader, disagreeing with U.S. President Harry Truman's policy of limiting the Korean war to avoid a larger war with China. The General also sent an ultimatum to the Chinese Army which wrecked President Truman's cease-fire effort.

This, and similar letters and statements, were seen by Truman as a violation of the American constitutional principle that military commanders are subordinate to civilian leadership, and as an attempt to usurp the President's authority to make foreign policy.

Unlike Sri Lanka‘s internal conflict over 30 years later, no-ceasefire over the Korean crisis and extending the war to China in 1951 would have undoubtedly led to Soviet Union’s direct involvement in the conflict resulting in a third world war and a possible nuclear holocaust. Truman wanted to avoid such a disaster at any cost since the world was then just recovering from the devastating effects of World War II which lasted six years (1939-1945).

By this time President Truman decided MacArthur was insubordinate, and relieved him of command on April 11, 1951, leading to a storm of controversy similar to the uproar in Sri Lanka’s Opposition ranks over the arrest of General Fonseka.

According to media reports President Truman was vilified in the foulest language worse than the way President Rajapaksa was blasted by some Opposition politicians during the last Presidential Election campaign and after Fonseka’s arrest.

“Impeach the B who calls himself President,” read one telegram typical of those pouring into Washington at an unprecedented rate—125,000 within forty-eight hours. “Impeach the little ward politician stupidity from Kansas City,” read another, voicing the contempt many now felt for the “plucky Harry” of just a few years before. The letters and telegrams, the White House admitted, were running 20 to 1 against the President. So were the telephone calls that jangled in every newsroom and radio studio. In countless towns the President was hanged in effigy.

Across the country flags flew at half-mast or upside down. Angry signs blossomed on houses: “To hell with the Reds and Harry Truman.”

Wherever politicians met that day, the anger in the streets was echoed and amplified. In Los Angeles the city council adjourned for the day “in sorrowful contemplation of the political assassination of General MacArthur.” In Michigan the state legislature solemnly noted that “at 1:00 A.M. of this day, World Communism achieved its greatest victory of a decade in the dismissal of General MacArthur.” (This recalls vehement attacks on the Rajapaksa regime for the alleged unjust and unfair treatment given to Fonseka who led ground troops to victory against the LTTE).

On the Senate floor in Washington DC, Republicans took turns denouncing the President: “I charge that this country today is in the hands of a secret inner coterie which is directed by agents of the Soviet Union. We must cut this whole cancerous conspiracy out of our Government at once,” said William Jenner of Indiana. Truman had given “the Communists and their stooges … what they always wanted—MacArthur’s scalp.” So spoke the country’s fastest-rising politician, Richard Nixon. Only four senators—two Democrats and two Republicans—dared defend the President.

At a hasty meeting on the morning of MacArthur’s dismissal, Republican congressional leaders came to a decision. They intended to use every political resource at their disposal to channel popular anger over MacArthur’s recall into a mass revolt against “limited war,” against President Truman.

It was a reckless decision: exalting MacArthur over the President, as Harold Ickes, the old Bull Moose Republican, was to warn a few days later, would set a “precedent” that would “develop into a monstrosity” —an uncontrollable military.

.” What MacArthur had done was to carry out a public political campaign designed to discredit the President’s policies and compel the White House to follow his own. For that the President had ordered his recall. If that recall were to end by destroying the President, if MacArthur, backed by a wave of popular support, were to force his policies on the civil authority, then for all practical purposes civilian supremacy over the military would become a dead letter. Given such a precedent, what future President would dare dismiss a popular general in wartime for publicly challenging his authority.”

General Matthew Ridgeway who replaced MacArthur, commenting on the latter’s strengths said:
“I had the deepest respect for MacArthur's abilities, for his courage and for his tactical brilliance.... I had profound respect for his leadership, his quick mind and his unusual skill at going straight to the main point of any subject and illuminating it so swiftly that the slowest mind could not fail to grasp it. He was, despite any weakness he may have shown, a truly great military man, a great statesman, and a gallant leader.”

But Ridgeway also understood MacArthur’s weaknesses:

“…The hunger for praise that led him on some occasions to claim or accept credit for deeds he had not performed, or to disclaim responsibility for mistakes that were clearly his own; the love of limelight that continually prompted him to pose before the public as the actual commander on the spot…his tendency to cultivate the isolation that genius seems to require, until it became a sort of insulation…that deprived him of the critical comment on the objective appraisals a commander needs…; the headstrong quality…that sometimes led him to persist a cause in defiance of all logic; (and) a faith in his own judgement that created an aura of infallibility and that finally led him close to insubordination.”

- Asian Tribune -