Lalin’s Column: Army’s Admired Innovations

Kamalika Peiris in her interesting article ‘SL’s Admired innovations’ in the Sunday Island of 26 Sep 10 while quite rightly highlighting those of the SL Navy and the STF, has not mentioned the Army or the SLAF. The aim here is to outline details of Army innovations on its 61st anniversary which is on 10 October.

Terrain dictated tactics but did not deter bold strategy. In the Wanni jungles movement was almost totally on foot often wading in waist deep or more monsoon flood waters, except on the main supply route. Day visibility was about 3-5 m at the best. Manoeuvrability for armoured vehicles was virtually non existent. The fighting was old fashioned at very close quarters, face to face and very cruel. No quarter was asked for or given.

Earlier failed strategy. During the early battles from the beginning to 2006 the army advanced on a narrow front due to movement and logistic difficulties but more so due to the cautious attitude of the senior commanders who taking counsel of their fears opted not to take risks by advancing on several fronts. The smaller forces of the LTTE concentrated their defences and held off the SL forces advance as the threat was limited. Then observing the over extended line of advance the LTTE repeatedly against all such advances mounted devastating attacks on the weakest point. The rout at Mankulam followed in the late 1990s on the A9 and ended that painful and pitiful strategy.

It pays to be bold-Advance on a several fronts. It was decided by the military high command in2007 to take risks and advance on several fronts despite monsoon conditions. The results are history as the rampaging divisions and task forces led by battle scarred Generals Shavendra de Silva, Jagath Dias, Charlie Gallage, Prassana de Silva and Nandana Uduwatte and others advanced boldly in jungle terrain while floods raged. They attacked concreted LTTE defensive positions beginning at Killinochchi dubbed ‘Stalingrad’ by ‘military correspondents’ relentlessly with great élan and fierce determination until the LTTE crumbled even at Mullativu which an Indian General had said grandiosely was ‘unconquerable’. The escaping LTTE remnants offered generous surrender terms refused, being misled by the West, certain traitors living abroad mainly and of course the Norwegians. They LTTE were surrounded on the beaches off the Nandikadal lagoon and despatched for ever, creating military history.

Role of SL Infantry - Overcoming the ditch cum bund obstacle. The SL forces suffered over 26,000 killed in the conflict of which 90% were from the Infantry. The contribution of the infantry to the victory of the forces needs no elaboration. They alone while manoeuvring in flood water conditions in pelting monsoon rains were faced with the formidable LTTE ditch (8-12 ft deep) cum bund (about 10 feet high - like a berm) obstacles in the final stages of the war.

These obstacles, stretching 20-30 kms in length were behind massive mine fields and were covered by LTTE weapon fire. The LTTE intended to make any attack on them too costly for the army. The defences gave Prabakaran a sense of invincibility which misled him and proved to be false.

Tactics.In the Wanni jungles movement was almost totally on foot often wading in waist deep or more water, except on the main supply route. Day light visibility was about 3-5 m at the best. Manoeuvrability for armoured vehicles was virtually non existent. The fighting was old fashioned at very close quarters, face to face and very cruel. No quarter was asked for or given.

Reconnaissance in force and Assault. The army deployed its Special Forces and Commandos to probe the LTTE defences, drive in the LTTE out posts by ambush and demoralise them by sabotage behind their lines. They identified the weak points in the defence. The infantry supported by SLAF close support sorties and massive artillery fire then launched a series of limited and feint attacks across the whole front thinning out the LTTE defences so that they were in strength nowhere. The main attack in over whelming force then breached the defences at the point of least resistance. The gap was widened for follow up forces to consolidate their positions behind the FDLs of the LTTE. Meanwhile the army engineers ingeniously extended the bund at either end, forcing the LTTE to thin out further. Reserve infantry then turned the flanks of the LTTE and attacked from the rear too, crushing the defence.

Not a Maginot Line. These attacks may not have been exactly like the German blitzkrieg forces of armour and ground attack planes in WW2 that smashed the Allied defences with the expected attack on the Low Countries but skirted the vaunted, supposedly impregnable French Maginot Line of linked concreted under ground posts. It left a third of France’s massive 5 million army uninvolved in the fighting. Guderian’s main Panzer attack took the Maginot Line from the rear, were it had no weapons. Guderian had attacked through what was thought to be the impenetrable Ardennes forest. But the SL attacks were as effective. A 30 year conflict was closed.

Infantry Regimental Line Up. The SL successes were won at tremendous cost in life with their tactics based on the blood and raw guts of the indomitable infantry consisting of the SL Light Infantry, Sinha, Gemunu Watch, Gajaba and Vijayaba regiments. According to the highest sources there were 7,000 deaths of soldiers in the last 3 months. A sombre comparison with the total NATO fatalities in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010 has been 2134 (US-1321) and in Iraq from 2003 the Coalition’s total was 5433 (US 4424) would show what sacrifices were made to make victory certain. Ours would appear to be appalling not just high.

Special Forces. The Special Forces were feared more than any other SL force by the LTTE. They were the brain child of Major (later Major General) Gamini Hettiaratchchi, founder commander of the SF who lost an eye to a LTTE sniper during an attack on the LTTE One four bases in the early 1990s. Where ever the SF operated the LTTE kept its distance. According to turned LTTE working for the SF, the LTTE would keep at least 5kms away from the SF if they believed or made to believe the SF was operating near them. The SF operated in teams of 4 and 8 deep into LTTE rear areas and took out LTTE top leaders mainly by ambush.

The LRRPs killing of Shanker the LTTE Air Wing chief and not the Norwegians drove the LTTE to negotiate. It can be reasonably assumed that the LTTE knew that RW was taking counsel of his fears when he came forward eagerly to sign the notorious CFA. The betrayal of the LRRP safe house and its operatives led to the LTTE operating with impunity in Colombo murdering who ever they pleased. The SF also did beach reconnaissance for amphibious landings and later trained the SL Navy Special Boat Section (SBS) on SF operations. The SF also trained the SLAF SF unit too.

Commandos. The Army Commandos, founded by Major (later Colonel) Sunil Peiris, were the first Special Forces SL had. They were initially trained in anti hijack and counter hostage taking duties by the Brit SAS. Later they did VIP security duties before reverting to their classic role of deep penetration of the enemy positions. They with the SF drove the LTTE into their numerous holes in the ground. The Commandos also have a third of their men trained in parachuting.

These skills were however never tested in the conflict. They can be very prohibitive in lives. The presence of paratroops may have tied down a considerable number of LTTE and kept them in reserve to deal with any attempt at airborne operations behind LTTE lines

Infantry Special Operations teamsThe regular Infantry organized Infantry Special Operations teams (ISOTs) to have skilled, highly motivated and trained specialists to drive in LTTE cadres operating to their immediate front. The Volunteer (actually ‘Territorial’ as all SL troops are volunteers) Infantry were given ‘Buddy Trio’ training to achieve the same results.

They were also trained in advanced infantry tactics and were tasked to dominate the ground, jungle and scrub mainly up to a distance of 300m forward of their own Forward Defended Localities (FDLs) in order to relieve the over stretched SF and Commandos. They were tasked by the battalion Commanding Officer and contributed greatly to the morale, confidence and success of their battalions and the disarray of the LTTE. The SF and Commandos operated beyond 300ms and deep behind the LTTE FDLs and were greatly responsible for the disintegration of the LTTE.

The Enemy Within. Finally there were those who struggled to get their snouts in the international payments trough. Their lethality has to be acknowledged. None better than the words of former British Prime Minister Baldwin echoed by a former British Army Chief of Staff Gen Sir Michael Jackson who said the media had ‘power without responsibility- the prerogative of the harlot’ can describe the enemy within. At the end of a 30 year conflict that took an appalling 100,000 lives we do not need ‘white flags’ as ‘innovations’ if not breath taking lies.

- Asian Tribune -