Lalin’s Column: Review- ‘A Most Noble Profession’--Corrections

Having read through former Army Commander General GH de Silva’s above named book, I hasten to correct two errors that could have been easily avoided had he only checked with me. I am privy to the facts.

My intention is to prevent a wrong recall of events in a document that may be used as a reference. It will affect its credibility. While the author says he made notes of all the events he has recorded in his book, I rely entirely on my memory, thus my haste! The events referred to were shared experiences of officers of the same super regiment, Gemunu Watch-motto –‘Tarry not, forward’.

The first error is with reference to Wellawaya where the first attack on a police station in the JVP insurgency took place at about 5am on 5th April (and not on 4th April as given in the book). Gen de Silva states “The Badulla Magistrate Douglas Wijeratne nearly died of a heart attack whilst inquiring into the incident in the afternoon, when two JVP members who were stranded and hiding in the water channel bordering the paddy fields behind the police station suddenly got up in front of him and started running for dear life. They had not heard the order to withdraw and were waiting for dusk to steal away. They were captured by the escorts after a chase and expertly executed rugby tackles”. Wijeratne was not even there. This is in the fanciful fiction by Wijeratne.

As officer commanding Bravo Company, I took over both Wellawaya and Monaragala on that day and commanded the Wellawaya detachment in situ while Lieutenant Gibbrey Muthalib (later Major General) proceeded to Monaragala as the detachment commander. My descriptions of the events of that day have appeared in an article in the Island on 8th April 2007 and in the Gemunu Watch magazine. Gen de Silva must have read it but he has persisted with Wijeratne’s version

I know well that Badulla Magistrate Wijeratne was not at Wellawaya on that fateful day, if ever. Major (later Major General) Gratian Silva and DIG late Rudra Rajasingham who had arrived by helicopter from Colombo were there. Gen Silva confirmed to me on 8 Aug 2011 that Wijeratne was never there.

This is what actually happened. The Wellawaya Police station had lost one policemen (the night reserve) when attacked by the JVP and another (Sgt Gunesekara) who was shot by the retreating JVP as he hurried forth from his home to help out not realising this was an insurgent gang.

On arrival from Diyatalawa I saw two youths, (both about 15/16 years old) while on a clearing patrol along the perimeter of the police station. They were lying transfixed to the side (niyara) of the paddy field. I thought they were two curious villagers who had come to observe the goings on in the station. Not thinking for a moment they could be insurgents and certainly not a part of the group of 25 insurgents who had attacked the police station, I asked them to scatter (‘Yanna! Yanna’ ! consciously avoiding ‘palayan’ which is derogatory) . The Wellawaya police had reported to the DIG that 500 insurgents had attacked and the DIG relayed this figure to Police HQ. The boys in mortal fear remained glued to the ground. They had apparently so been doing so for hours since the abortive attack. Policemen and became restless. It then dawned on me that they could be insurgents. I drew my 38mm revolver, pointed it at them. It was the first time I had ever aimed a pistol at a man far less two young lads scared out of their wits. I angrily asked them to stand up (‘nakitipan’). I called them ‘yakkos’ (devils) in my astonishment and concern at seeing such youthful miscreants.

I impressed on them they were my prisoners. They were shivering in fear. I then had to prevent a possibly murderous assault on them by a frustrated and baying police constable (Amugoda from Ambalangoda) and two rifle butt swinging artillerymen under the command of Lt Bashur Musafer. The gunners had come from Hambantota before us. They returned forthwith thereafter.

I reassured the boys that they would not be harmed and ordered the police not to touch them. No one disobeyed me. I asked Sergeant Punchi Banda to give them the standard PW(Prisoner of war) treatment given in Diyatalawa for officer cadets captured on exercise-a thorough wetting (bath). It had little effect in steamy Wellawaya. They were then separated and given a slip of paper and pencil each and asked to write down the names of all the people who took part in the attack on the police station. They produced 25 identical names. I think the word spread that we knew who they were. We had only to seek them albeit scattered in the jungles or having fled elsewhere further off. The end of the insurgency in Wellawaya had begun.

The second error is that when Gen (then Lt Col) GH de Silva came to Ampara to take over the Combat Training School (CTS) from me in early October he says he had been extolled by the ‘army commander Gen Weeratunge to .... train our soldiers to shoot back’. He errs again. Maj Gen Denis Perera was army commander at the time. The CTS like the Commandos and the Womens’ Corps were his enduring innovations. Weeratunge was Chief of Staff and never communicated with the CTS in my time.

A book of this nature by an Army Commander no less should have had all its facts verified and researched as stated at the launch by Susil Siriwardene former CCS and my class mate. Its credibility and value will otherwise be thoroughly diminished.

- Asian Tribune -