Multi cultural nationalism in Sri Lanka

No country in the world today could be identified as having a one hundred percent homogenous cultural identity although some countries have varying degrees of such homogeneity than others. Greater the homogeneity, easier it would be to link the cultural identity to what might be described as the identity’s nationalism.

In this context, It would not be out of place to describe the expression of a cultural identity as cultural nationalism, in contrast to expressing a country identity as geographic nationalism, where land and sea boundaries identify the geographic entity as country A, B or C, and everyone lives under one political system within that land mass.

Many countries have a situation where different cultural identities live in one geographic area, and either willingly or otherwise lives in multi cultural settings, accepting geographic nationalism as their common identity.

A cultural identity of a group of people encompasses its language, religious backgrounds, traditions, social structure, and other features that distinguish it from other cultural identities. All these are bound in historical threads, and longer these threads are, the more intertwined they are, and more difficult to unwind them and link them with other cultures.

Amongst these characteristics, language naturally is a key factor and cultural nationalism is at times referred to more commonly as linguistic nationalism.

Some cultural identities have been influenced overt time by others, and the homogeneity of such cultures has been diluted to an extent as a result. Cultural evolution (not necessarily for the benefit or advancement of a culture) would result as a consequence of these influences, and what may have been identified as a particular cultural identity at a particular point in time, would be still identified as that cultural identity, but the nature and the construct of that culture would be different to its previous construct.

In Sri Lanka for example, Sinhala culture has been influenced by Western culture and habits, as much as it has been influenced by Eastern cultures, but more specifically by what might be termed generally as Indian culture. Historically, the bi products of successive foreign invasions, Royal inter marriage with Indian princesses, and regular trade with other countries, have all found their way into Sinhala culture and influenced its internal diversity.

It may be argued therefore that what one identifies as Sinhala culture today is in fact a cross cultural identity unlike Tamil culture, which in comparison has been less influenced by other cultures perhaps because of their more insular nature and resistance to change.

It is the position of this writer that in the main, the reason why Sinhala people like to associate Sri Lanka with the Sinhalese is because of the cross cultural nature of the Sinhala identity and not because of any superiority over other cultures.

Most Sinhalese probably see Tamil as well as Muslim and Burgher culture as part of this synonimity, although due primarily to the numerical superiority, what is identified as Sinhala culture and their practices may appear to over shadow other cultures and their practices within the geographic entity.

Of course within this generalization, various social, economic and religious factors have interplayed, and they have given rise to conflicts arising from opportunities for opinion makers and politicians (and invaders) to exploit them for their benefit.

Some countries have managed to find ways and means for different cultural identities living within it to find mutually agreeable ways to express their cultural nationalism better than others, while some have fought bitter wars to establish which cultural identity is superior to others, or is more representative of the country identity.

Cultural diversity, although enriching, could also be injurious to society unless the diverse identities have reached a mutually acceptable degree of tolerance, respect and understanding of each other’s strengths and weaknesses.

If history is to be a guide, such conflicts and wars are centuries old and are bound to continue for centuries to come. The one difference now is the advent of the information age and how fast and widespread it is, and how pervasive intrusions are into the lives of individuals, and what effect this will have on cultural identities in years to come.

The internet has become the greatest social re engineering tool known to mankind in living memory, with few being able to predict what lies beyond what is known and available today. None can really predict where this will lead social structures and practices as we know them today.

Sri Lanka has had its share of conflict and war, and the recently concluded war with the LTTE is just the latest of confrontations recorded in the history of the island. However, even if war itself may or may not eventuate again, conflict is bound to surface as governance generally happens on account of opportunism rather than idealism.

Arguments put forward by various shades of opinion as to how conflict could have been avoided and could be avoided in the future; underestimate the very nature of conflict and opportunism within and amongst cultural identities. In Sri Lanka, these conflicts are hundreds of years old, and contrary to the thinking that it is a post Independence phenomena, its roots go back centuries.

Some come up with arguments that Sri Lanka had been a collection of Kingdoms at different times, both Sinhala and Tamil ones, and as that had been possible then, it should be possible now too for different cultural identities to co-exist as independent political administrative units.

However, the fact that even in the past, they did not co-exist for long and were influenced by internal and external factors resulting in conflict, and wars, is proof that such co existence models did not work then and may not work now.

Internal and external influences continue to occur as they did then. A good example is the Darusman Report and the Channal4 video, both depicting alleged atrocities committed by the State, answerable to international covenants, and a non State apparatus answerable to no one, except the leader of that apparatus.

While the authenticity of these alleged atrocities have yet to be established, these external influences have impacted on reconciliation between the two main cultural identities in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Where this will lead these two cultural identities is very much anyone’s guess as those on the offensive continue to feed the fires of discord with questionable and largely unauthenticated allegations.

As stated earlier, anthropologists, social scientists and other experts associated with the study of human behavior from cultural contexts, argue that some cultural identities either undergo constant change or resist such change depending on their numerical position within a multi cultural setting and how strong the external influences are.

This could be interpreted to say that a numerically minority group within a country would purposefully or unwittingly resist change for fear of identity dilution or perceived loss of it. The Tamils of Sri Lanka belong to this category and they in all likelihood would aspire to be a majority within a demarcated land mass as a reaction to external influences on their cultural identity.

In order to justify this wish, debatable historical arguments are put forward to support such a land mass demarcation. The flame of a Tamil homeland theory forms the basis for such a strategic objective, and it is constantly fuelled nationally and internationally using such historical arguments, as the creation of such a land mass based on contemporary realities would not support such a demarcation.

Fortunately for the Tamils, and unfortunately for the Sinhalese, at least the conceptual need for such a demarcation has been fortified by the Sinhalese themselves, through their short sighted, vision and strategy vacuum activities.
A blessing in disguise of sorts for the Sinhalese has been presence of Tamils of more recent Indian origin living primarily in the Tea plantation sector of the country, and the cultural differences that exist between them and the so called “Sri Lankan Tamils”. This has made the Tamil aspirations harder to define and achieve, as it is unlikely that these two sub groups amongst the Tamils of Sri Lanka would want to advertise their cultural affinities except for purpose of political expediency.

In more recent times, besides this factor, the case for Tamils to realise their aspiration for an independent or autonomous political administrative unit to safeguard their cultural identity has taken another setback as more and more Tamils from the North and the East have relocated themselves to other parts of the country as well as other parts of the world.

While the reasons for this might be manyfold, the fact remains that the presence of two sub groups of Tamils within the country, and that more Tamils live outside the North and East than within that area now, has made the case for an independent or autonomous political unit in the North and the East quite difficult to establish and sustain.

In the light of these developments and contemporary realities, and the two major cultural identities not finding a mutually acceptable multi cultural co existence, Sri Lankan multi culturalism is at the cross roads again. Although the internal threat to peace and stability from the LTTE is no longer there, internal and external pressure to accommodate Tamil aspirations is still very much there, but Tamils are yet to articulate an alternative to self government of a demarcated land area as a means of achieving their aspirations.

If reality and objectivity were to prevail, the aspiration for an independent or autonomous political administrative unit in the North and East will have to be reconsidered by those who are still canvassing for it. This however does not and should not mean that Tamil aspirations for their cultural identity to be safeguarded and preserved in whatever form they chose to, should be discarded or ignored by others.

It would help the reconciliation process if the differences in the way Tamils and Sinhalese consider their cultural identities are recognized by both communities, as a solution for co existence in a multi cultural setting within one political administrative unit (geographic nationalism) might lie within that understanding.

The Sinhalese should recognize that the Tamil identity is more homogenous than the Sinhala identity, as the latter has been influenced by other cultural identities to a greater extent than the former.

Tamils on the other hand should recognize that most Sinhala people do not have a notion of superiority and ownership of the country that some within the community are propagating that they do. It is more likely that the contemporary identity of most Sinhalese is not what is promoted by a minority within the community, and that this contemporary identity sees itself as a Sri Lankan identity because of its cross cultural nature, where Tamil culture is also considered part of this cross cultural identity.

Having said this, it needs to be recognized that this identity is also subject to internal pressure from a Sinhala identity from the old school of thought, and unfortunately it is this identity that has been dominant for sometime leaving many to believe that the contemporary identity is in fact representative of the traditional identity.

As stated earlier, political opportunism is a feature of governance irrespective of whether a country is a democracy or an autocracy. Religions have also become institutionalized and their governance (in some peoples mind, their very existence) too relies on opportunism. If true religious philosophies were to govern religions, and the people who subscribe to a particular religion followed these philosophies, political governance would have become closer to idealism, fair play and righteousness.

This however is a pipe dream, and the reality is that one has to accept what is, rather than what it should be, and the accompanying challenges, and find ways and means of better enmeshing different cultural identities in mutually acceptable mosaics that one might call multi cultural nationalism.

Sri Lankan cultural diversity does not appear to have been able to weave that multi cultural mosaic, at least not as yet. Thirty years of terrorism in sixty three years of independence has taken its toll. Hardliners still appear to hold sway over moderates, although they are much less in numbers. Cultural identities need to discuss and negotiate in order to develop that mosaic. One can only hope they will do that and future writers would not have to write about more wasted years.

- Asian Tribune -