Lalin’s Column: Review- ‘A Most Noble Profession’- by General GH de Silva

This is the first auto biography by a SL Army Commander. It could therefore be not only a trail blazer but a serious attempt at portraying in depth the tumultuous and tragic events and the back ground to them in 36 years of military service.

It must be hoped that it will be a useful reference for those in the military to gain useful insights into the army especially during the 30 year conflict that caused over 70,000 deaths and the inglorious well deserved end of the terrorist LTTE.

Susil Siriwardene and Rajiva Wijesinghe (RW) have made some very pertinent observations on the book on 31 July and 24 July in the Sunday Island. These observations are a critical follow up.

Military conflict which is often heroic is sometimes noble but often “It is not an adventure. It is a disease. It is like typhus”. (Antoine de Saint –Exupery)

Gen de Silva as an army commander would have been privy to many facts that the public would like to know. Had he included them the book would have been more credible. By not doing so or ignoring them he has done himself and the readers a disservice. If it was anticipated that this book would unravel the real facts and figures of the conflict, give details (of both sides) in battles that made headlines and history, an in depth analysis of the successes and failures of that long conflict and the personalities and actions of the leading actors, the reason for the astronomical level of desertions and the charges of unbridled corruption, it disappoints. RW diplomatically says the author’s analysis was ‘thoughtful but never oppressive’. It thus leaves more unsaid than said.

To begin with there is a raging controversy as to the events of the final days of the Eelam conflict. This covers serious allegations against the army. It has been ignored or studiously avoided although the book includes an analysis of the final ’Military Victories’ which occurred after his tenure and views on ‘Defence priorities after the war’. This was an opportunity for him to have expressed an opinion supportive of the SL forces. It would have helped to neutralise or demolish, destroy and bury the allegations made. It does not. In fact all previous army and senior commanders too should have done so individually or as a group in a forceful and credible way.

Nearly 20,000 soldiers were killed and over double that maimed for life while the civilian casualties in SL were over 50,000 in 30 years of conflict. Honouring the dead and wounded would have been better served by educating the public as to the reasons for this enormous casualty roll which must affect over 2 million people, who including meddling politicians were responsible for colossal casualties and military debacles and why they were rarely if ever punished. Some were even promoted. Why did some army commanders keep saying the LTTE could not be defeated in the battlefield? Why did the defeat of the LTTE, which had less than 10 cadres when hostilities began, take so long? Why were there, almost continuously except for the last 3 years of conflict, a staggering number of deserters? What action was taken to minimise it? What was the truth of the recurring allegations of corruption by senior officers? Why could it not be prevented in spite of the army having such a rigorous disciplinary code?

There is no mention of Brig TI Weeratunge’s ill advised, febrile campaign in Jaffna in 1979 that led to stiffening Jaffna’s response, his appointment as Commander Security Forces Jaffna by passing the Army Commander Gen Denis Perera with direct access to President Jayewardene, (his uncle -mother’s brother) thereby by passing and under mining the authority of the army commander Denis Perera, his premature declaration that the separatist insurgency had ceased by end 1979, the so called ‘gang of four’ advisers , the tactics and methods Weeratunge permitted in Jaffna to counter civil agitation when he took over command, the escalation of violence, the responsibility for the cataclysmic 1983 riots (this is referred to in passing as ‘Black July’ in one sentence) and its devastating consequences.

When the UNP ‘legionnaires’ went to Jaffna to bolster the party faithful before the 1981 DC elections they were all accommodated at the Fort.Weeratunge came by plane from Colombo late in the evening. Every one looked for instructions and plans for the morrow. Instead, a long drinking session began according to a former mayor of Colombo. When they broke up late at night they were told that they would be briefed in the morning. There was murder and mayhem the next day. Was this how much of Weeratunge’s command was exercised? de Silva could have shed light on this instead of just calling Weeratunge a ‘kelle pissa’ (jungle lunatic) He was much more.

The barbaric burning of the Jaffna library in 1981 is completely missed out but a near mutiny following the deaths of 2 soldiers in Jaffna on 14 October 81 is covered in detail. There is a cryptic reference to rampaging Sinha Regt troops.

Sadly when a soldier cook (there were three of them) carrying tins of petrol with a group of policemen intent on burning Jaffna town had the temerity to ask for a box of matches from a Armoured Corps major, the 3 officers present including the author, instead of arresting the 3 about to be military arsonists “had a tough time trying to persuade them to desist from such destructive action. They opted to leave”. This was the army under Weeratunge, compromising discipline, moral authority, command and control. No wonder 1983 was a disgrace.

The book, just over 700 pages covers most of the stirring incidents of the conflict but fleetingly while small ‘actions’ with just 17 troops are described in minute detail. The big battles won and lost are not adequately described even though official reports are available. Maybe this is a problem in an army that did not keep war diaries .Maj Gen Hakirat Singh IPKF recalls (in his book)diarising the ‘order’ given to him by Indian HC Dixit to ’shoot Prabakaran when he came to surrender’.

The irascible Hakirat’s retort was that he would ‘not shoot anyone coming to surrender in the back’. A noble thought but a very difficult performance indeed when confronting another!

There is also little said about the JVP 1988/9 terror campaign that led to 60,000 deaths in just over one year.

The public is still at a loss to understand how Mullativu, its fortifications (barbed wire, mines and bunkers) progressively improved, that had held out for over 25 years against repeated onslaughts ,was lost in just over a day in 1996. Could it be due to the fact that after the IPKF ‘invaded’, some very good middle ranking officers in the combat arms of the army (infantry, commandos, armour and artillery) quit and officers from non combat units were authorised to join the teeth arms(infantry and armoured ) to better their career prospects in what was expected to be fully peace time army? Who was responsible for such shocking, short sighted and puerile decisions and thus certainly for this debacle? It is not even commented upon.

It resulted in officer who had been in charge of farms of the SLA General Service Corps transferring into the infantry (Vijayaba Regiment).Thus in Mullativu a clueless Lt Col was by rank the senior most officer in command of 1200 troops (his and the other battalion) on that fateful day as the General Officer Commanding had gone to Colombo to attend to an inquiry. ( Gen de Silva’s repeated revelations make this absence of senior officers appear to be a very common coincidence when a crisis developed). The official figures of those killed in Mullativu are 1173 (Humanitarian Operations-Factual Analysis July 2011) but Gen de Silva gives a round figure of 2,000 (page 183). These rounded off figures abound in the book, diminishing its impact.

The major battles had staggering casualties. Elephant Pass in 1991(156 killed), Pooneryn 1993 (227 killed 305 missing), Mandaitivu 1995 (90 killed) are mentioned but not described in detail. In Killinochchi 857 men died in the last of 3 battles in 1998 before it was abandoned, making a total of 996 dead. 197 died at Vettilaikerrni (1999) 117 at Oddusudan (1999), 628 at Ariyalai (2000) and 191 at Muhumalai (2006) which portrays the huge price that was paid in lives sacrificed before eventual victory in 2009. This should be contrasted with the losses of only 7,000 men in the Coalition Forces in a total of 19 years of war in Iraq (8) and Afghanistan (11).Was even one Army commander amongst those selected purely on political grounds, not responsible?

An opinion as to how and why Elephant Pass was allowed to be cut off from its water and logistic resupply from the North in 2000 could have been given without stating the bald facts only. Who was responsible for its loss? Why was no attempt made to destroy the LTTE blocking position? Why was Maj Gen Gamini Hettiaratchchi’s request for such offensive action denied? If Gen de Silva had commented on these events rather than merely scatter the dust off the battles his book would have been historically significant and made more captivating reading.

With reference to the JVP insurrection in April 1971he says erroneously that at Wellawaya “The Badulla Magistrate Douglas Wijeratne nearly died of a heart attack whilst inquiring into the incident in the afternoon when two JVP members who were stranded and hiding in the water channel bordering the paddy fields behind the police station suddenly got up in front of him and started running for dear life”.

The correct version has been published in the Island on 8th April 2007 and in the Gemunu Watch Veterans’ Souvenir (March 2006. Gen de Silva, a captain then and also from Gemunu Watch should know. In fact 2 youths (age about 15 years) were lying transfixed to the side (niyara) of the paddy field when the Wellawaya detachment commander (this writer) on arrival patrolled the police station perimeter and found and arrested them with little drama. Certainly no one ‘nearly died of a heart attack ‘or attempted ‘rugby tackles’.

I would contest his description of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Unlike West Point USA ,Sandhurst does not break down a cadet. Right from the start it builds him up. That results in the difference in confidence, behaviour and conduct between the ‘cousins’ on military operations.

No sensible alumni of Sandhurst would ever have liked to go back after commissioning to become a cadet at Sandhurst again as Gen de Silva opines. If he did, it would have rubbished the ethos of a military academy. He would also be abandoning his first and best command for which he was specifically trained.

Possibly the problem here was that 2nd lieutenant de Silva having been made assistant adjutant, a peace time army extravagance and sop to clerical demands had no command of troops on joining the Sinha Regiment. It was an aberration that should never have been allowed to happen. There is no better command in the army than the first – a platoon of 30 odd young men. They are the ones whose judgement worries you, not that of your seniors. It takes time. No one laughs at your jokes until one day even though it wasn’t all that funny they all laugh uncontrollably at one of yours. It takes months after exercising them on Fox Hill in section and platoon drills, night patrolling exercises, running 9 miles with a 40 pound pack on your back, climbing ropes, shooting on the firing ranges from the crack of dawn to last light (dusk), taking them out on a week end in the forest glades of Gurutalawa, and taking all they give (knocks and all) playing soccer, hockey or rugby including having your nose broken in the latter two and proving your prowess at cricket or singing with them in their ‘huts’ after dinner. They, your men, are then willing to follow you anywhere, even if it is out of sheer curiosity!

Gen de Silva also says that when he met with the Pope, Bishop Gomis remarked that the Pope had given him more time than any one else. However he does not say what was discussed for so long. It can however be guessed. Surely it was peace not war. His later fixation with ‘political’ solutions instead of ‘military’ to defeating the LTTE may have been strengthened by this long jaw with the Pope.

Gen de Silva does not say why as a Lieutenant Colonel he was not given command of his own regiment, especially during a full blown insurgency . Who was behind it and why?

The very first chapter of a book he calls ‘A Most Noble Profession’ starts ironically with a most ignoble ‘Opening Gambit’. There is a description of a stormy meeting at AHQ where army commander Waidyaratne in a bout of envy (which was par for him) attempts to humiliate, ‘insult’ and ‘degrade’ his most formidable and best known battle field commanders Kobbekaduwa and Wimalaratne. It ends with Kobbekaduwa submitting his resignation the next day ‘by throwing it in Waidyaratne’s face’ This was despite Gen de Silva who was Chief of Staff entreating unsuccessfully with the two disaffected officers not to do so.

The ‘gambit’ ends softly with drinks all round and an apocryphal story, possibly under the influence, about some premonition Kobbekaduwa had about his impending death. Then in a dramatic ending both Kobbekaduwa and Wimalaratne die within 8 days of the forecast. de Silva leaves the reader to speculate. Let there be no doubt that that the land mine that killed them and 6 others was an LTTE one. Had Gen Kobbekaduwa survived he would have become the next army commander.

There is also a reluctance to call the LTTE terrorists. The word militant is more often used perhaps to be ‘un oppressive’.

No mention is made of the corruption in the army that had at least 3 army commanders no less facing criminal charges. There is little on the treacherous conduct of 3 Generals in gifting the LTTE with weapons, ammo explosives and cash, albeit under orders from President Premadasa. There should have been at least a chapter on each of them.

There is broad brush treatment for the debacles as though only one man was responsible for them where as there were many.

There is instead a chapter on a visit to Pakistan and a description of the death of Pakistan’s President Zia ul Haq who had invited Gen de Silva and family on a visit. Four pages are devoted to a description on the causes leading to the death of Zia in a plane crash.

More military photos would have improved the layout of the book. Of the about 25 photos only 5 show soldiers. Two show the Pope, 7 have politicians(local and foreign) and one even an Indian film star. There is none of Kobbekaduwa and Wimalaratne, enduring national icons, even though he shared a ‘firm comradeship’ with them.

It is certainly the first book by an army commander. Hopefully those that follow will in the words of Susil Siriwardene the key note speaker at the launch be ‘disciplined, research their material carefully, verify their facts, analyse in depth and reflect on events’ and aim at greater credibility. The public will then have a comprehensive if not better understanding of the great military events that shook the nation. Hopefully Siriwardene’s appeal for ‘societal rebuilding’ with ‘A moderate consensus’ will also emerge.

- Asian Tribune -