Blinded by Hubris

By Tisaranee Gunasekara

"Further: that which is not in excess is good, and that which is greater than it should be is bad". Aristotle (Rhetoric)

In an increasingly globalising world there can be no political, economic or cultural islands. In an interconnected and interdependent world there are realistic limits to the exercise of sovereignty by any country. These limits are more stringent for small underdeveloped countries with a pronounced tendency to mismanage their affairs. That is the Lankan condition today. Still the objective impediments to the exercising of Lankan sovereignty may not have reached critical levels, had not our economy been so rundown, our finances so perilous or the global economic crisis so dire. But in a context characterised by an ailing economy, a debt cum foreign exchange crisis and global economic devastation, Sri Lanka may not be able to avoid an Argentinean outcome (bankruptcy and civil instability) without Western assistance.

Sri Lanka’s request for an IMF bailout resulted from a belated and unwilling acceptance of this harsh reality. Unfortunately with the naïve imbecility that characterises its outlook and actions on most issues, the Rajapakse administration expected the IMF to bail it out, just for the asking, sans strings. The President obviously failed to comprehend (or perhaps none told him) that the manner in which the war is prosecuted and the displaced civilians are treated can impact on Sri Lanka’s chances of an IMF bailout, given the total Western domination of the Brettenwood twins.

The problem was foreseeable even though it was not foreseen. The Obama administration is far more sensitive to human rights concerns than its predecessor. And the US owns the biggest voting block in the IMF (voting at the IMF is based not on ‘one country one vote’ principle, but on the size of the quota allotted to each country; and the US has the largest voting rights amounting to 16.77% of the total votes). This has enabled the US to use the IMF as an instrument of her Foreign Policy. When Sri Lanka asked for the US$1.9 loan from the IMF she should have been aware of these unpleasant but unavoidable realities. Now the US is using its clout at the IMF to delay the loan in order to put pressure on Colombo: “The United States has decided to delay a US$1.9 billion International Monetary Fund loan to Sri Lanka to try to pressure Colombo to do more to help the civilians caught in the fighting between the government and Tamil Tiger rebels, US officials said… the Obama administration last week conveyed its view to other members of the IMF board, which has yet to formally consider the loan” (Reuters – 30.4.2009).

Such are the limits of our sovereignty. We have the right to tell the Americans to keep their human rights concerns for Iraq and Afghanistan, just as the US has the right to delay/block IMF loans and we have the right to make-do (or not) on whatever funds provided by our uncritical friends (China, Libya et al). We have the right to prevent the Swedish Foreign Minister from entering Sri Lanka together with his British and French counterparts, just as an incensed EU has the right to revoke our GSP privileges later this year and we have the right to close down some more garment factories. A poor country’s right to political sovereignty is not much different from a poor man’s right to starve; in Sri Lanka’s case the rulers will not starve; the people will.

A Chandi Malli Foreign Policy

Very few international actors will mourn the demise of the LTTE which is banned in the US, the UK, the EU and India. What is at issue is not Sri Lanka’s right to wage war against and defeat the Tigers; what is at issue is the manner in which Sri Lanka is treating her Tamil citizens – i.e. human rights and devolution. In a recent statement the UNHCR says that it has “received persistent reports of physical assaults on men and women fleeing into government controlled areas” and reminds "the government of its responsibilities towards the civilian population and to ensure the protection of its own citizens" (Briefing Paper – 28. 4.2009). A less extreme and more humane attitudes towards civilian Tamils caught in the war zone or held in 'welfare villages', a sincere effort to solve the ethnic problem via devolution and greater verbal restraint could have saved Sri Lanka a heap of negative publicity and an outbreak of adverse reactions.

There are many ways of saying no, some of them polite, some not, some downright uncouth. The Rajapakses seem to be favouring the third variant increasingly, in the conduct of Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy. Why was the Swedish Foreign Minister denied a visa at the last moment, in a manner that was calculated to humiliate that country and by extension, the EU, which holds the future of our garment industry in its hands? Since the government was not going to agree to a ceasefire, would it have mattered if Mr. Bildt joined Messers Miliband and Kouchner?? What did we gain from such juvenile behaviour other than plaudits of a minority of Sinhala hardliners? Was that worth the angering of the economically and politically powerful EU and thereby risking the GSP+ privilege at such an economically critical time?

Why go out of the way to annoy powerful international players who can harm the country in return? It was quite one thing for the Secretary of Defence to have a heated argument with the visiting British and French Foreign Ministers; it was quite another thing for the Ministry of Defence website to carry a gloating report of this exchange. The first may have been unavoidable; the second was unnecessary. Civilised countries do not engage in such impolite conduct; intelligent countries avoid such idiotic behaviour. Do we not understand that coarse deeds such as these damage Lankan interests, whatever the cheap thrills they may give a section of the powers that be? Cannot we realise that such actions serve to strengthen the arguments of our enemies and turn potential friends or neutrals into foes?

The government’s decision to cease using heavy weapons and aerial bombing on the sliver of land left in Tiger hands, obviously a response to Indian pressure, was both sensible and timely. According to UN estimates around 50,000 civilians are still holed up in that tiny space; consequently bombing and shelling will amount to a form of ‘collective punishment’ of these unfortunates.

But having acted thus sensibly and humanely, albeit under pressure, the government seems to be backtracking already. Both the UN and the US State Department have talked about ‘continuing shelling among civilians’ after Monday’s announcement. If these reports are confirmed, Sri Lanka’s standing in the international arena will suffer further. When William Hague, Conservative MP and shadow British foreign secretary, raised the possibility of Sri Lanka reneging on this promise just as she went back on an earlier promise to permit a team from the UN access to the conflict zone, Foreign Secretary David Miliband replied that that such conduct will impact adversely on Sri Lanka’s relations with the IC.

Moreover the Tamil Nadu crisis, defused with Colombo’s timely pledge of restraint, will reignite, compelling a desperate Delhi into drastic behaviour especially in this election season. And Sri Lanka should not permit the creation of a situation in which the Indian state perceives a stark choice between promoting de facto or de jure separatism in Sri Lanka and protecting India’s unity and strategic interests. Because, in such a context India would not hesitate to adopt the Bangladeshi option, especially if her old nemesis, Vellupillai Pirapaharan, is no more.

Determined to achieve a Grand Finale by capturing the Tiger Chief, the Lankan state is resorting to excesses which are already rebounding on it. Caught in a frenzy of hubris, the Rajapakses are antagonising powerful international actors whose support is a sine qua non to keep the economy afloat and prevent a resurgence of Tamil separatism (and of the LTTE, if Mr. Pirapaharan survives). Intent on pleasing its hardline Sinhala allies, the regime is further alienating Lankan Tamils, without whose willing consent a united and peaceful Sri Lanka is but a mirage. The ultimate irony will be if the Lankan Forces wrest the last sliver of land from Tiger control (as they will) at tremendous human and political costs, to discover that the Tiger Chief has flown many a day ago.

Portents

The government won the Western Provincial Election. The UPFA is at the zenith of its popularity; the war is manifestly won, the economic crisis is yet to be felt fully and the UNP is in more disarray than ever. Bur in the seven Sinhala majority provinces in which elections have been held so far, the UPFA’s vote increased by a paltry 192,354 compared to 2005 Presidential election (of this 46,868 votes – 24.36% was from Nuwaraeliya district, a direct outcome of the shift in CWC’s political allegiance). The UNP’s vote count between 2005 and 2008/9 decreased by a massive 1,433, 111.

Still there was no significant shift of support from the UNP to the UPFA; though a large number of UNP parliamentarians, desirous of enjoying the trappings and the privileges of power, changed sides, ordinary party supporters did not. Many just abstained from voting, causing the huge drop in the number of votes cast between 2005 and 2008/9. These disillusioned supporters can be won over if the UNP manages to rid itself of the Ranil Wickremesinghe leadership and his discredited policies.

The government may celebrate in public; but its leaders cannot be unaware of the tenuous nature of its victory. Keeping Ranil Wickremesinghe as the leader of the UNP is a necessary condition for the UPFA to win the upcoming national elections, but it is not a sufficient condition. Therefore the regime would want to hold the Northern displaced in ‘welfare villages’ until national elections are over. People who are deprived of the right of movement will not be able to cast their votes as they wish, and it takes no foresight to predict that 90% or more of these unfortunates will ‘vote’ for the UPFA and Candidate Rajapakse. The government will also be more intolerant of dissent, using the cover of patriotism to hide and justify its descent into authoritarianism.

The prices of a number of essential items went up last week. The 2% increase in the Nation Building tax is likely to push prices upwards, even further. The handful of friendly countries left to us will provide some financial assistance but this will not be enough to keep the foreign exchange crisis or the debt trap at bay. The delay in the IMF bailout will increase the pressure on the Rupee, which will fall further, since the government no longer has the capacity to prop it. This will exacerbate imported inflation, from fuel to basic food items. As public discontent increases, the government will find it necessary to resort even more to Sinhala supremacist rhetoric and policies to keep its Sinhala base vote from eroding. This in turn will increase minority fears and discontents and further undermine our relations with the West and India.

The LTTE is suffering an unprecedented military defeat. The credit for this spectacular achievement belongs, in the main, to the Rajapakse administration and its single-minded determination to eliminate the Tigers. Similarly, the setbacks and debacles Sri Lanka experiences on all other fronts are, by and large, caused by the excessive policies and irrational attitudes of the Rajapakses. Only time will tell whether the price extracted from the country by the regime for the vanquishing of the Tigers, is, worth it.

- Asian Tribune -