Trouble All Around

By Alla Baksh - Syndicate Features

It now appears that matters foreign will require urgent attention of the government that comes to power after the 15th Lok Sabha polls. A question that will bother some is: will the next administration in Delhi be able to handle on a priority basis the crisis that has gripped three countries surrounding India, and the hints of a chill in bilateral relations with the US.

India itself may face a crisis of sorts if, as predicted by most pundits, the poll verdict is again fractured. There is a chance that political equations may have to be rewritten after the polls and it will present the sight of some strange bedfellows coming together. Cobbling up a coalition with new partners may, however, not take too long, given the politicians’ legendary lust for power and pelf. But deliberating on new strategies to meet the challenges in the neighbourhood and getting the nod of coalition partner’s takes time.

The nature of the crisis in the South Asian neighbourhood differs from country to country. That rules out devising a uniform solution for them, even though some will doubt India’s ability to bring any change at all in the situation in these countries. India has never been in a position to influence the course of events in Pakistan, but countries where India is presumed to have some leverage, Sri Lanka and Nepal, have also lately adopted courses that make Delhi unhappy. A worsening of situation in these countries is a clear possibility and that can spell more trouble for India.

While Pakistan has been a perennial headache for Indian policy makers and will remain so for a long time, Delhi may have to think fast to face the situation in the traditionally ‘less hostile, at times friendly’ neighbours, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Some analysts may see it as a failure of our diplomacy, but it is hard to see how India could have averted the kind of crisis Nepal faces. It is largely the result of the obduracy of the Maoists whose one-point agenda seems to be to se up a Utopian government that will actually be a one-party rule. India may have played a role in restoring peace in Nepal but the Maoists are hell bent on antagonising all the political parties in Nepal by refusing to honour their commitments under the peace deal.

With the possible exception of the Indian Marxists, no Indian political party is in a position to play any role in ironing out the current differences between the Maoists, headed by ‘Prachanda’, and the rest of the political class in Nepal. The Indian Marxists, if the Maoists are willing to listen to them, will be reluctant to take any initiative because, one, they do not mind the Maoists setting up a pro-China dictatorship in Nepal, and two, a Maoists ruled Nepal will keep the Americans at bay.

As for the rest of the political class in India and the government in Delhi, they cannot be seen overtly talking to the other partners in the present coalition in Nepal without raising the old bogey of ‘Big Brother India meddling in the affairs of Nepal.’ The Maoists have already, in fact, raised an anti-India cry in the country.

There is an irony in the crisis that has developed in Sri Lanka. While the militant Tigers, despised as much by officials in India as those in Colombo, are all but totally wiped out, peace is still away from the island nation. Colombo has received a lot of flak, instead of pat for breaking the back of the LTTE, from the international community for its failure to look after the Tamil civilians who fled from the war zones.

The civilians’ problem in Sri Lanka has had a chain reaction in India with Tamil Nadu threatening to boil with discontent if the Tamil civilians in Sri Lanka are not protected and looked after well. The decades old wounds about discrimination against the Tamils in Sri Lanka have also surfaced. Delhi finds it cannot force Colombo to respond to the situation in a way that pacifies the Tamil sentiments in India. In the coming days, no major shift in this posture of Sri Lanka can be expected. But the government of India cannot wait indefinitely for a satisfactory solution of the Tamil problem in the island nation.

India may be used to facing a relentlessly hostile and unreasonable Pakistan, but a Talibanised Pakistan will be a bigger monster next door. The direction in which events in Pakistan are moving would suggest that irrespective of what Pakistan’s guardian angels in Washington might be saying, the land of the pure is ready to concede large parts of its territories to Taliban influence.

The Pakistanis will sell it as the best way to ensure peace within the country and the Americans will be assured that the contended ‘Pakistani Taliban’—already identified as the ‘good Taliban’--will help in driving out the US-specific terror outfits like Al Qaeda and the ‘bad Taliban’ from the Pakistani soil.

The Americans are used to the Pakistani charade and will probably continue to put up with the duplicity of Islamabad in the hope that it will eventually eliminate, or at least minimise, threat to them from Al Qaeda.

Threat to India from ‘elements’ within Pakistan will multiply many times after the ‘good Taliban’ have been rehabilitated. These ‘good Taliban’ have as much lust for blood and gore as the ‘bad’ ones and will direct all their energies to executing Pakistan’s ‘bleed India’ policy after they are free from creating mayhem within the country in order to bring outdated Islamic laws to the tribal regions the country.

Since the US backs the idea of installing the ‘good Taliban’ in Pakistan, India’s response will have to counter the moves of the old master and its client in South Asia. The new government in Delhi will have to be more assertive and aggressive in talking to both the Americans and the Pakistanis in stating its position. The difficult part will be the ability to talk tough without inviting the charge of being arrogant.

Such a balancing act will not be possible with Pakistan, given the implacable nature of its hostility towards India. But the US will have to be engaged in a meaningful dialogue to avoid a total reversal of Indo-US bilateral relations to the Cold War era. What makes it look difficult is that the Obama administration in the US has concentrated too much attention on Pakistan and pandering to its whims to bother about Indian sensitivities.

- Asian Tribune -