Sri Lanka: New (Tamil) Front Man needed to combat LTTE global strategy

By Daya Gamage – Asian Tribune Political Analysis
Washington, D.C. 06 April (Asiantribune.com):

The period, commenced in early 1980s, the U.S. to understand the nuances of Sri Lanka’s ethnic problems and related issues. The prime focus was the Tamil Tiger campaign, both political and military. The extensive exercise was to develop comprehensive policy planks for the Washington policymakers and Capitol Hill lawmakers.

Lakshman Kadirgamar with Indian PM Manmohan Singh

The significant issues as recalled by this writer who was the diplomatic mission’s political specialist were; (a) the Tamil Tiger or LTTE’s lethal campaign in the north-east region (b) the destabilization in the rest of the country due to the lethal campaign of the separatist group (c) Sinhalese-Tamil race relations (d) the political strategy of the government and the operational maneuvers of its armed forces, and (e) the Tamil ‘National Issue’ and related grievances, and Sinhalese reactions to such issues.

The perspective of Tamil National Question was taking shape within the American diplomatic mission in Colombo an emerging critical national issues at that period, and the mind-set of the FSOs and their Washington colleagues was gradually being shaped as to how Washington should view Sri Lanka’s ‘national issues’ , what motivated the GSL to frame policies and the obstacles on their path to implement some of the agreed policy planks, and reaction to such policy implementation.

Despite the Tamil Tiger movement unleashed a nation-wide terrorism that Colombo American diplomatic mission and Washington decried, many among the US diplomatic corps strongly felt that the Tiger movement grew as a result of minority Tamil grievances, obstacles placed in their path and the increased Sinhalese hegemony in the governing apparatus since the sixties.

Which is why the Colombo US diplomatic mission not only scrutinized the LTTE’s military campaign but also its political message. The scrutiny was not limited to Sri Lanka but in other countries that included the United States.

While the LTTE political, fund raising and arms procurement network was taking shape in late eighties and early nineties in the U.S. and several European Union nations, a significant development was taking place within the Tamil Diaspora in the West. There was a considerable resistance to LTTE activities in western nations, especially in the U.S., seen within the Tamil Diaspora when western intelligence agencies started receiving covert information about the Tiger activities on American soil.

The April 18, 1983 United States embassy bombing in Beirut that killed 52 American diplomats, military personnel, and Lebanese Embassy colleagues put American authorities on high alert to terrorist networks worldwide, and when information from the Tamil Diaspora was reaching the intelligence networks in late eighties and thereafter it greatly contributed to foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar’s efforts in the latter part of the nineties to designate the LTTE a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).

In fact, the Tamil Diaspora was not with the LTTE in totality, and even since the demise of the Tiger movement in 2009 there was insignificant support for the Tiger agenda. Sri Lanka either failed to do a comprehensive study of the position, nature and the composition of the Tamil Diaspora or misread the events within the Diaspora. Had Sri Lanka taken prompt policy decision to harness the Tamil Diaspora establishing a cabinet-level ministry for expatriate Sri Lankans, one would not have seen the emergence of pro-Eelam organizations which subsequently became the voice of the Tamil Diaspora. LTTE leader Prabhaharan never tolerated parallel organizations anywhere in the world.

Nevertheless, one could see the developing mind-set of the American FSOs which had a serious effect on Sri Lanka in later years.

Somewhere in 1991, a year or so since the brutal suppression of Sri Lanka’s southern Marxist rebel group JVP along with the questionable death of its leader Rohana Wijeweera in November 1989, a group of foreign service officers (FSOs) at the Colombo’s American embassy was in a routine meeting to exchange views, discuss political issues developing at that time of the host country, and figure out what Washington needs to know to facilitate the development of policy planks regarding Sri Lanka.

The Tamil issue played a prominent role at this internal gathering in which this writer was a participant.
The said routine meeting’s atmosphere took a different direction when one of the FSO’s made the comment with displayed authority that “Sinhalese army is killing the Tamils” referring to the ongoing military operation in the north-east region combating separatist LTTE.

Prior to this ‘comment’, this writer had had several official meetings with the then General Officer Commanding (GOC) the North Lt. General Denzil Kobbekaduwa in his office in Colombo and had briefed the Mission of the progress of military operations against the Tigers some of which were previously unknown to the diplomatic mission. The writer used his old school ties with General Kobbekaduwa and the rapport built in the late-1960’s when he was out of the Sri Lanka Army on compulsory leave for alleged involvement in a military coup (1966) to get a deeper understanding of events in the north and the political maneuvering in the south as the General was well connected to principal players in the political stage at that time one being the opposition leader Madam Sirimavo Bandaranaike, his close relative, and many others in the ruling party.

Why did the ‘Sinhalese army killing the Tamils’ sentiment creep into the mind-set of the FSOs that political observers in later years clearly saw as a catalyst for the emergence of overall American foreign policy foundation to build other policy planks surrounding Sri Lanka issues. Undoubtedly, these have had serious consequences to Sri Lanka’s global image in subsequent years. Nevertheless, at the time the ‘sentiment’ was aired General Kobbekaduwa was highly regarded as a soldier who was compassionate toward Tamil civilians?
This writer already in several briefings had told the hierarchy of Colombo’s American diplomatic mission that Kobbekaduwa used three principles in his counter-insurgency war measures: firstly, he did not believe in holding down land, secondly, he believed in drawing the enemy away from populated areas to minimize civilian deaths and with advance maneuvering and superior firepower strain and destroy the enemy firepower, and thirdly make the civilians realize that they were better off trusting the armed forces. In fact, the UNHCR once paid a tribute to him for his humanitarian approach to the beleaguered Tamil population.

The current defense secretary Colonel Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who was posted to the northern war theater under Kobbekaduwa, could vouch for the latter’s humanitarian approach.

This writer explained to those who were at this meeting that the government and its security forces considered both the LTTE and JVP enemy combatants and were equally a threat to national security, and despite the Tiger fighting cadre were totally made of ethnic minority Tamils and the JVP cadre were all Sinhalese the security forces treated both groups as threats, and defeating the Tigers and the JVP cannot be interpreted as defeating the Tamils and the Sinhalese respectively.

But the FSO who made the ‘killing’ remark was joined by at least two other FSOs to distinguish between the two movements, one made up of ethnic Tamils who had fewer influence over a polity largely controlled by the majority Sinhalese thus advocating self determination for the Tamil people, and the other with ideological differences aimed at a regime change to install an orthodox Marxist regime.

What this writer understood during the discourse of that meeting and subsequent scrutiny of the ‘developed’ mind-set of the FSOs was that the U.S.-designation of the Tigers as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 1997, it’s acknowledgment of Norwegian brokered 2002 ceasefire agreement between the GSL and the Tigers, the State Department’s encouragement of peace talks (personally initiated by Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage and current external affairs minister Prof. G.L. Peiris) between the two warring factions to achieve a peaceful political settlement and in support of bringing Tamil Tigers toSri Lanka’s mainstream, the U.S. tactical and intelligence assistance to defeat the Tigers but short of total annihilation, the United States political maneuver to make the ethnic minority Tamil population stakeholders of Sri Lankan affairs and lowering the hegemony – a term occasionally used by the FSOs in Colombo during that period – of the majority Sinhalese, a significant policy plank had been engraved in the overall policy structure of the State Department.
The United States intervention in the current Sri Lankan affairs and its effective Geneva involvement, the American lawmakers and policymakers’ perennial dialogue with the Tamil Diaspora and U.S.

‘advise’/’lectures/counseling’ to the GSL and the effect of Tamil Diaspora politics in U.S. foreign policy while the U.S. strategically using those foreign policy planks manipulating the Tamil Diaspora to bring changes in the overall governing style and structure of Sri Lanka are largely drawn from the perspectives the state department developed between the early eighties and mid nineties.

“The Sinhalese army is killing the Tamils” sentiment continues to govern the American psyche and intensified since the war ended in May 2009 effectively replenished by the professional activists within the Tamil Diaspora – activists who were once with the LTTE propagating its ‘self determination’ agenda, providing ‘material support’ to it by way of legal/professional advice, encouraging raising funds for the terror movement and even advocating procurement of arms describing the movement as a liberation organization of the Tamils – projecting Washington and activists of the Diaspora as strange bed fellows.

Can a Sinhalese front man break this ‘unholy alliance’ between the two, which gradually emerged since the assassination of Sri Lanka foreign minister of Tamil origin Lakshman Kadirgamar a threatening alliance Sri Lanka has so far failed to tackle, or a new front man of Tamil origin who is capable of exposing the dubious characters of the ‘operatives’ within the Tamil Diaspora (a way beyond proscribing their global fronts), who could provide a better explanation to sensitive issues between race relations, undertake more effectively public diplomacy and strategic communication, identify differences that exist but strangely suppressed between the Tamil Tigers and Tamil issues and who has a deep understanding of issues that are widely discussed among the Sinhalese majority, who could expose the diplomatic/political adventurism of activists within the Tamil Diaspora and who has the capacity to establish the confidence of a broader Tamil audience in Sri Lanka and similarly one who could maintain a working rapport with the executive leadership of this South Asian nation whose name has not been adversely mentioned in any State Department document.

Doesn’t Sri Lanka get the message?

Whenever US state department officials advocate the importance of reconciliation, reparation and transparency they do it with a display of authority. The narrative is very convincing, and the discourse has driven the handlers of Sri Lanka’s external affairs off course.

The United States, in promoting reconciliation, transparency and accountability, uses its own values the Founding Fathers gave the nation from which the activists within the Tamil Diaspora draw from to gravitate toward American psychology. And since the end of the war in May 2009 Sri Lanka allowed a gradual building of a cohabitation between the operatives within the Tamil Diaspora and the policymakers in the State Department and lawmakers in the Capitol Hill.

To get the full effect and meaning of Sri Lanka’s most recent step to declare 16 global front organizations that are covertly strategizing to bifurcate Sri Lanka, the lifelong dream the LTTE leader Prabhaharan, the need has arisen to ‘expose’ the one hundred-odd global activists the GSL proclaimed as associates of those 16 global fronts to bring down that cohabitation.

From where does the state department officials in South a/Central Asia division and the Office of Global Criminal Justice (previously known as Office of War Crimes) get the confidence to lecture Sri Lanka with authority?

What reconciliation means to the U.S. government officials is to find a fitting place for the minority Tamils to exist and live within the borders of Sri Lanka and allow them to handle their own affairs in their ‘traditional homeland’ in the north-east region, and create a conducive atmosphere in the rest of the country for the Sinhalese and Tamils to peaceful coexist within a unitary state.

That’s what I understood when working with American foreign service officers (FSOs) for two and a half decades, and thereafter well into the conclusion of the war in May 2009, and since, scrutinizing American official pronouncements and documents while conversing with my former colleagues with whom I have had professional dealings.

The Sri Lanka cabinet spokesperson Minister Rambukwella is often confused with what the Americans meant by ‘credible’ when they exert pressure on the GSL to undertake investigations to ‘what went on’ during the final months leading to the defeat of the Tamil Tiger movement. What the state department meant by ‘credible investigation’, according to this writer’s understanding of their mind-set, was such investigation has to ‘greatly’ satisfy Washington and the professional activists of the Tamil Diaspora both of whom ‘broadly’ believed that the military massacred the Tamil civilians who were held hostage by the LTTE fighting cadre during the final weeks of the battle.

Only in the footnote the state department officials remark the importance of investigating the ‘LTTE atrocities’. Both the Sri Lankan authorities and American counterparts have begun to give less attention that there are still eelam activists within the Tamil Diaspora advocating transparency, accountability, and influencing western power centers to take Sri Lanka to task for ‘war crimes’ until the Sri Lankan authorities took a surprising step to declare 16 global Tamil Diaspora organizations proscribed, a very rare diplomatic maneuver, in the first week of April 2014 .

Now, someone needs to make this decision effective in global power centers, policymakers and lawmakers.
To get the record straight, these professional activists within the Tamil Diaspora who have been in ‘touch’ with Washington policymakers and lawmakers long before the war ended and intensified their dialogue after the conclusion of the war were those who provided ‘material support’ to the LTTE in the form of professional/legal advice, involved in raising funds to fatten the ‘war chest’ of the Tigers and encouraged the procurement of lethal weapons for the fighting cadre of the Tigers declaring and convincing Washington that the LTTE was in fact a ‘liberation movement’ of the 12% Tamil minority of Sri Lanka.

The Asian Tribune in these columns have reported that the GSL could activate a dialogue with the US Departments of Justice and Homeland Security to prosecute some of them under US Federal Laws for their involvement with a designated FTO, and for that, proscription of the organizations they represent does not make that prosecution more effective.

But one significant development was the identification of one hundred-odd global activists who had been associating with a US-designated FTO in violation of US Federal Laws.

It was noted earlier that the American FSOs believed that the Tamil grievances and excessive Sinhalese domination gave rise to the Tamil Tigers.

When the LTTE was defeated, the agenda of bifurcating Sri Lanka moved into the hands of these activists who largely became the ‘voice’ of the Tamils and convinced Washington, London, Bonn, Paris and other Western Capitals that they are the legitimate owners of the minority Tamils of Sri Lanka.

The issue we are trying to settle in this Political Note is how to dislodge these ‘Material Supporters’ in exposing their credentials to US authorities of their culpability to providing ‘Material Support’ in violation of US Federal Laws, highlight the contradiction between the activists’ objectives and what is beneficial to the Sri Lankan Tamil people and effectively break the existing rapport between these fake Tamil champions – fake human rights champions – and the rest of the US policymakers and lawmakers. Who is capable of exposing this scenario? a Sinhalese or a Tamil? Whose advocacy is more acceptable to American policymakers and lawmakers?

We repeat.

Can a Sinhalese front man break this ‘unholy alliance’ between the two, which gradually emerged since the assassination of Sri Lanka foreign minister of Tamil origin Lakshman Kadirgamar- a threatening alliance Sri Lanka has so far failed to tackle, or a new front man of Tamil origin who is capable of exposing the dubious characters of the ‘operatives’ within the Tamil Diaspora (a way beyond proscribing their global fronts), who could provide a better explanation to sensitive issues between race relations, undertake more effectively public diplomacy and strategic communication, identify differences that exist but strangely ignored and suppressed between the Tamil Tigers and Tamil issues and who has a deep understanding of issues that are widely discussed among the Sinhalese majority, who could expose the diplomatic/political adventurism of activists within the Tamil Diaspora and who has the capacity to establish the confidence of a broader Tamil audience in Sri Lanka and similarly one who could maintain a working rapport with the executive leadership of this South Asian nation whose name has not been adversely mentioned in any State Department document.

This is the trajectory to denying the operatives within the global Tamil Diaspora of the ‘ownership’ of the Sri Lankan Tamils and bring the vast Tamil Diaspora and their kith and kin living within the borders of the Island of Sri Lanka back into the Sri Lankan fold.

Washington’s Receptiveness in 1997

Why was Washington receptive to Sri Lanka’s reasoning and presentation about the description of the separatist/terrorist Tamil Tiger movement in the late 1990’s to adopt a policy stance to designate the movement a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act? This Washington move was four years prior to al Qaeda-orchestrated lethal attack on America, and during a time the U.S. was not so active in its later adopted Global War on Terror despite American authorities took defensive and often limited offensive measures after 1983 Beirut American embassy attack that killed 52 Americans.

What were the U.S. federal laws that designated a foreign group/movement a FTO?

In fact the LTTE did not fit into the category of a terrorist movement in relation to the threat to American interests at home or abroad, interests that surround trade, investment, national security, foreign policy or to physical threat to American citizens.

Legal criteria for designation under Section 219

— It must be a foreign organization

— The organization must engage in terrorist activity or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism

— The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States

Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tiger movement, established in the late seventies, became active in the predominantly Tamil north-eastern region in about mid-eighties and subsequently terrorized the entire nation was never a threat to American presence – diplomatic or otherwise – in the island. The movement had no record of being a threat to American interests in Sri Lanka and the South Asian, region (or globally) when Sri Lanka approached the State Department to designate it a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 1997.

The question is why and for what reason did the USG take an unprecedented move to designate the movement when it did not fit into the category of “The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States”.

The person instrumental in persuading the United States with cogent arguments to designate the LTTE a FTO was the then foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Having understood the general psyche of American officials, this writer has no hesitation to determine that the state department received Mr. Kadirgamar’s diplomatic overtures because of his ethnicity; Tamil. Having studied in the same school he attended in Kandy and knowing many of his contemporaries and acquaintances during his high school days, this writer was aware that Mr. Kadirgamar was a broad-minded liberal, and despite his ethnicity, never entertained narrow outlook toward Sri Lanka’s national issues. But most importantly, in the eyes of Washington diplomatic and power centers, he was a Tamil who was advocating the terrorist designation on a groups totally comprised of his own ethnicity. It made a vast difference when Kadirgamar displayed himself as the ‘front man’ instead a person from the Sinhalese majority community urging American authorities to ban a movement which was widely accepted in Washington as somewhat connected to Tamil grievances.

Kadirgamar’s effort was greatly helped by the information about Tamil Tiger operation in the United States covertly supplied by members of the Tamil Diaspora to American intelligence networks which was grudgingly donating a certain percentage of their earnings to fatten the LTTE overseas fund.

Playing a significant role in having the LTTE banned internationally, 1997 in the U.S. and 2001 in Britain as Sri Lanka’s foreign minister, Mr. Kadirgamar, despite being a Tamil, became critical of the attempts to negotiate with the terror movement while being President Kumaratunga’s foreign policy advisor and was highly critical of the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement between the GSL and Tamil Tigers when he most cogently expressed in his speech from the opposition ranks in parliament on 8 May 2003.

This was how a minority Tamil ‘Front Man’ played a critical and significant role in foreign policy handling for Sri Lanka.

Neelan Tiruchelvam assassination

Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam, who was killed by a suicide bomber in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on 29 July 1999, was a leading scholar and activist in the field of human and particularly ethnic-minority rights, both internationally and in his native Sri Lanka. A Tamil, he represented the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) as a Member of Parliament and at the time of his death was working with the Sri Lankan government on constitutional reform and devolution.

He devoted much of his energies over the years to the dominant political question in Sri Lanka of the rights of minorities, in particular of the Tamil population. In response to inter-ethnic unrest and conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the Tamils, he dedicated himself to peaceful constitutional changes that would accommodate the needs of both communities.

He was director of the highly regarded International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) in Colombo, a non-governmental institute that promotes public understanding of ethnic issues and researches innovative approaches to the reduction and resolution of ethnic conflict.

Tiruchelvam was described after his death as “the main political link between Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities”.

Sri Lanka on a different trajectory at present

As much as reconciliation among ethnic groups is a foremost issue in Sri Lanka, this South Asian nation is faced a different situation that both Kadirgamar and Tiruchelvam never confronted; the strategic grouping of professional activists within the Tamil Diaspora in the United States and European nations, their newly acquired ‘mask’ to project themselves as human rights defenders and spokesperson for the Sri Lankan Tamils and their issues, the cohabitation between western policymakers and the professional activists, and their agenda to bifurcate the Island nation of Sri Lanka strategically working closely with major groupings in the international community.

Reconciliation, harmony among ethnic communities and resolving issues which confront all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka are secondary to them.

And, the foreign policy handlers in Sri Lanka do not seem to have comprehend the gravity of this until resolutions after resolutions emerged at UNHRC in Geneva.
This Political Note very clearly outlined the parameters of the trajectory of the professional activists within the Tamil Diaspora.

To combat the operatives and expose them to break them from the Tamil Diaspora which had faced brutality in the hands of the LTTE agents within the western society, and convince the internal players that the trajectory taken by these operatives is detrimental to the interests of the Tamils and other communities living in Sri Lanka, this South Asian nation needs a new ‘Front Man’ of ‘Tamil Origin’ who has broad knowledge of the profiles of the operatives, their machinations, race relations, the nation’s interests and its international relations.

Let us repeat:

Can a Sinhalese front man break this ‘unholy alliance’ between the two, which gradually emerged since the assassination of Sri Lanka foreign minister of Tamil origin Lakshman Kadirgamar- a threatening alliance Sri Lanka has so far failed to tackle, or a new front man of Tamil origin who is capable of exposing the dubious characters of the ‘operatives’ within the Tamil Diaspora (a way beyond proscribing their global fronts), who could provide a better explanation to sensitive issues between race relations, undertake more effectively public diplomacy and strategic communication, identify differences that exist but strangely ignored and suppressed between the Tamil Tigers and Tamil issues and who has a deep understanding of issues that are widely discussed among the Sinhalese majority, who could expose the diplomatic/political adventurism of activists within the Tamil Diaspora and who has the capacity to establish the confidence of a broader Tamil audience in Sri Lanka and similarly one who could maintain a working rapport with the executive leadership of this South Asian nation whose name has not been adversely mentioned in any State Department document.

Sri Lanka needs to deeply concentrate as to how to fill the void created by the assassinations of Kadirgamar and Tiruchelvam. The scenario, however, was different during the time those gentlemen handled the issue. The current scenario needs completely different strategy and trajectory using the expertise of a person who is broadly knowledgeable of the emerged trend and how and why it has became national security threat and a diplomatic disaster to Sri Lanka.

The closest person to play this role at present is this Online Daily Newspaper Asian Tribune Editor in Chief Kanapathipillai Thambirajah Rajasingham

A person with a very broad understanding and insight on Sri Lanka’s pressing national issues connected to ethnicity, KT has lived into an erudite age to steer clear of Tamil chauvinism, and deep understanding of the Sinhalese intrusion to disturb the rich Tamil cultural heritage, rich as much as the Sinhalese cultural heritage, when activists within both these major ethnic formations destabilized this South Asian nation since independence in 1948.

A person who hailed from a rich Jaffna Tamil heritage he is not reluctant to expose adventurist tendencies of Tamil chauvinism thrust upon ethnic Tamils, Mr. Rajasingham is well aware of how Sinhalese nationalism competed with Tamil adventurism and how both extremist tendencies disrupted the traditional coexistence and harmony among the two nationalities in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka succumbed to both extremist tendencies completing losing track of exactly what trajectory the nation needs to take for broader progress, maintaining individual ethnic identities but a collective national outlook.

Someone who knew the nuances and intricacies of the Sri Lankan society was Lakshman Kadirgamar, and the Tamil adventurist movement, the LTTE, cut short his national contribution. The Tamil Tigers viewed Neelan Tiruchelvam an obstacle in their path to silence him too.

This writer who maintained professional dealings with Dr. Tiruchelvam was privy to the series of discourses he had with American officials within and outside the portals of the Colombo diplomatic mission in the eighties and nineties.

And that understanding synchronizes with how and in which manner Mr. Rajasingham could engage toward national reconciliation, help safeguard national security and diplomatic overtures.

Since the demise of those two men Sri Lanka’s international dealings did not include a Tamil who could cogently present the nation’s interests. At present, with the developing scenario, as we have broadly presented in this Political Note, Sri Lanka needs a Tamil ‘Front Man’ who could develop a strategy to counter the Eelam rump within the Tamil Diaspora.

Countering the operatives within the Global Tamil Diaspora is the prerequisite to resolving many pressing national issues confronting the nation.

Sri Lanka’s lackluster handling of US-sponsored resolution last three years, its total inability to expose the Tamil Fronts and their operatives to separate Sri Lanka national issues from being diluted and this South Asian nation’s foreign policy handlers failure to devise a strategy to remove the influence of Eelam Operatives bent on shaping the mind-set of Western policymakers and lawmakers and put Sri Lanka’s national issues/interests on correct perspective are the primary concern at present.

As was done a decade ago, Sri Lanka needs a ‘Tamil Face’ in its international dealing mechanism, and the visible person to fill that slot is K.T. Rajasingham. The scenario a decade ago was different to that of today with operatives within the Tamil Diaspora playing a significant role to devoid Sri Lanka of a narrative. Sri Lanka’s narrative was taken over by these operatives since the war was over in May 2009, and someone needs to bring it back to Sri Lanka’s orbit.

Having had the opportunity to work with American Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and with a clear understanding of their mind-set considering the current predicament Sri Lanka is in, a ‘Tamil Face’ is the necessity at this hour.

The current dismal profile of Sri Lanka’s handling of public affairs, public diplomacy and strategic communication needs a drastic change.

– Asian Tribune –